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Abstract We consider the problem of designing efficient mechanisms to share
the cost of providing some service to a set of self-interested customers. In this
paper, we mainly focus on cost functions that are induced by prize-collecting
optimization problems. Such cost functions arise naturally whenever customers
can be served in two different ways: either by being part of a common service
solution or by being served individually.
One of our main contributions is a general lifting technique that allows us
to extend the social cost approximation guarantee of a Moulin mechanism for
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the respective non-prize-collecting problem to its prize-collecting counterpart.
Our lifting technique also suggests a generic design template to derive Moulin
mechanisms for prize-collecting problems. The approach is particularly suited
for cost-sharing methods that are based on primal-dual algorithms.
We illustrate the applicability of our approach by deriving Moulin mecha-
nisms for prize-collecting variants of submodular cost-sharing, facility location
and Steiner forest problems. All our mechanisms are essentially best possible
with respect to budget balance and social cost approximation guarantees.
Finally, we show that the Moulin mechanism by Ko¨nemann et al. [27]
for the Steiner forest problem is O(log3 k)-approximate. Our approach adds
a novel methodological contribution to existing techniques by showing that
such a result can be proved by embedding the graph distances into random
hierarchically separated trees.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
We consider the problem of sharing the cost of providing some service to a set
of self-interested customers (or users). At an abstract level, such problems can
be described as follows: We are given a set U of k players and a cost function
C : 2U → R which specifies a cost C(S) to establish the service for player set
S ⊆ U . Every player i ∈ U derives a privately held valuation vi from being
served. We are interested in finding a cost-sharing mechanism M that first
solicits bids (bi)i∈U from all players and then determines a set SM ⊆ U of
players to service and a payment pi ≤ bi for every player i ∈ S. The utility
ui of player i is defined as vi − pi if i ∈ SM and is 0 otherwise. We assume
that each player i ∈ U wants to maximize his utility. A player might therefore
misreport his actual valuation if this increases his utility.
In such settings, the servicing cost C(S) of a subset of players S ⊆ U often
naturally relates to the cost function of an underlying optimizing problem. For
example, the cost of connecting a set of users residing at terminal nodes in a
network might be given as the cost of a Steiner tree on these terminals. The
cost of opening warehouses at selected locations to minimize the transportation
costs to all customer sites can be defined as the optimal solution cost of a
facility location problem. Several classical optimization problems have been
studied in a cost-sharing context in recent years.
In this paper, we focus on a natural extension of the above cost-sharing
viewpoint: We assume that every player i ∈ U can be served in two different
ways: either player i is part of a common service solution which is shared among
all participants, or i is served individually. For example, in the warehouse
application mentioned above one may want to consider the option of building
an on-site storage facility for the customer as an alternative to outsourcing
his goods to one of the available warehouses. Such extensions give rise to cost
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functions that are captured by so-called prize-collecting optimization problems
(or optimization problems with penalties).
An example of such a problem is the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem
(PCSF): We are given an undirected graph G = (V,E) with edge costs c : E →
R+, a set of k terminal pairs R = {(si, ti)}i∈[k], and penalties pi : R → R+.
A feasible solution (F,Q) consists of a forest F ⊆ E and a subset Q ⊆ R of
terminal pairs such that for all (si, ti) ∈ R either si, ti are connected by F or
(si, ti) ∈ Q. The objective is to compute a feasible solution of minimum cost
c(F ) + pi(Q).
In the cost-sharing context, we associate each terminal pair (si, ti) ∈ R
with a player i ∈ U whose goal is to connect si and ti. The service provider
can choose to either connect the terminals si and ti through a common network
F , or to connect si and ti individually at a cost of pi(i). That is, the servicing
cost C(S) for player set S ⊆ U is defined as the cost of an optimal solution of
the prize-collecting Steiner forest instance with terminal pairs {(si, ti)}i∈S .
1.2 Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
When it comes to the design of cost-sharing mechanisms, there are several
desirable properties that one would like to achieve. A cost-sharing mechanism
M is called strategyproof if bidding truthfully (i.e., announcing bi = vi) is a
dominant strategy for every player i ∈ U . If this is true even if players are
permitted to collude (formal definitions will be given in Section 2), then we
call a mechanism group-strategyproof. M is budget balanced if the total cost
C(S) of servicing the players in S is equal to the sum of the payments charged
to the players in S. Further, M is efficient if it selects a set SM of players that
maximizes v(S)− C(S) among all subsets S ⊆ U .
Classical results in economics [17,35] state that budget balance and ef-
ficiency cannot be achieved simultaneously by any mechanism. Moreover,
Feigenbaum et al. [15] showed that there is no strategyproof mechanism that
always recovers a constant fraction of the optimal efficiency and a constant
fraction of the incurred cost, even for the simple fixed-tree multicast problem.
In light of these hardness results, most of the previous work on mechanism
design concentrated on proper subsets of the above design goals. One notable
class of such mechanisms are so-called Moulin mechanisms [30,31]. A Moulin
mechanism M(ξ) is based on a cost-sharing method ξ, which defines a cost
share ξi(S) for every player i ∈ S and every S ⊆ U . The mechanism starts
with the entire player set S = U . In each iteration, it proposes a cost share
ξi(S) to every remaining player i ∈ S. If all players accept their cost shares,
it outputs SM = S as the set of served players together with the payments
(ξi)i∈S and stops. Otherwise, it removes all players that are not willing to pay
their cost shares and continues with the next iteration. Moulin [30] showed
that the mechanism M(ξ) is group-strategyproof if the underlying cost-sharing
method ξ is cross-monotonic, i.e., the cost share of each player increases as
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other players leave the game; formally, for every S ⊆ T ⊆ U , ξi(S) ≥ ξi(T ) for
every i ∈ S.
Moulin’s framework has been applied to several classical optimization prob-
lems such as submodular cost-sharing [31], fixed-tree multicast [3,14,15], min-
imum spanning tree [23,25], Steiner tree [23], Steiner forest [27], set cover
[21], facility location [33], connected facility location [19,28,33], and machine
scheduling [8,10]. Lower bounds on the budget balance factor that is achievable
by a cross-monotonic cost-sharing mechanism were studied in [21,26,27].
Roughgarden and Sundararajan [38] introduced an alternative measure
of efficiency that circumvents the intractability results in [15,17,35] at least
partially. The authors define the social cost Π(S) of a set S ⊆ U as Π(S) =
v(U \ S) + C(S). A mechanism M is said to be α-approximate if the set SM
it outputs has social cost at most αminS⊆U Π(S). The intuition behind this
definition loosely comes from the fact that v(U)−Π(S) = v(S)−C(S), which
is the traditional definition of efficiency. Since v(U) is a constant, a set S has
minimum social cost if and only if it has maximum efficiency.
Roughgarden and Sundararajan [38] then developed a framework to quan-
tify the extent to which a Moulin mechanism minimizes the social cost. They
applied this framework to show that the Shapley mechanism is O(log k)-
approximate for submodular cost functions and that the cost sharing method
of Jain and Vazirani [23] for the Steiner tree problem gives a mechanism that is
O(log2 k)-approximate. In a subsequent paper, Chawla, Roughgarden and Sun-
dararajan [11] applied the framework to show that the Moulin mechanism of
Ko¨nemann et al. [27] for the Steiner forest problem is O(log2 k)-approximate.
In a following paper, Roughgarden and Sundararajan [37] proved polylogarith-
mic upper and lower bounds for facility location, Steiner tree and rent-or-buy
network design problems.
1.3 Our Results and Techniques
One of our main contributions is a general lifting technique that allows us to
prove social cost approximation guarantees of Moulin mechanisms for prize-
collecting problems. Basically, our approach enables us to lift the approxi-
mation guarantee of a Moulin mechanism M(ξ¯) for an optimization problem
to a Moulin mechanism M(ξ) for the prize-collecting variant of the problem.
The approach naturally applies to cost-sharing methods that are based on
primal-dual algorithms, where cost shares relate to dual variables of a linear
programming relaxation of the problem and are grown as a process over time.
Our lifting technique also suggests a generic design template to derive
Moulin mechanisms for prize-collecting problems. Here the high-level idea is to
adapt the cross-monotonic cost-sharing method ξ¯ for the non-prize-collecting
problem simply by “freezing” the cost share of a player i when it reaches his
penalty pi(i). By exploiting our lifting technique, all one is left to do then is to
prove cross-monotonicity and (approximate) budget balance of the resulting
cost-sharing method.
Cost-Sharing Mechanism for Prize-Collecting Steiner Forest 5
problem non-prize-collecting prize-collecting lower bounds
submodular cost (1, 2Hk) [24] (1, 2Hk + 1) (1, Hk) [38]
facility location (3, Hk + 3) [33] (3, 3(Hk + 4)) (3, Hk/3) [21,38]
Steiner forest (2, O(log2 k)) [27] (3, O(log2 k)) (2, Ω(log2 k)) [27,38]
Table 1 Summary of results obtained for prize-collecting problems in this paper. Each pair
(β, α) states the budget balance (β) and social cost (α) approximation guarantees for the
respective problem.
We illustrate the applicability of our approach by deriving Moulin mecha-
nisms for prize-collecting variants of submodular cost-sharing, facility location
and Steiner forest problems. Our mechanisms are essentially best possible with
respect to both budget balance and social cost approximation guarantees (for
the latter a constant gap remains). An overview of the specific approximation
guarantees obtained in this paper and the known lower bounds are given in
Table 1.
Technically, the most challenging part lies in obtaining a 2-budget bal-
anced Moulin mechanism that is O(log2 k)-approximate for the Steiner forest
problem. Our algorithm is a natural extension of the primal-dual algorithm
of Agrawal, Klein and Ravi [1] for prize-collecting Steiner trees and the cross-
monotonic cost-sharing method for Steiner forests presented by Ko¨nemann et
al. [27]. Despite its simplicity, our algorithm achieves the same approximation
guarantee as the combinatorial algorithm by Hajiaghayi and Jain [20].
Finally, we show that the Moulin mechanism by Ko¨nemann et al. [27] for
the Steiner forest problem is O(log3 k)-approximate. This is achieved by adding
a novel methodological contribution to the framework proposed by Roughgar-
den and Sundararajan in [38]: We show that such a result can also be proved
by embedding the graph distances into random hierarchically separated trees
(HST) [5,13]. Independently, Chawla, Roughgarden and Sundararajan [11]
showed (using a more involved analysis) that the Moulin mechanism derived
in [27] is O(log2 k)-approximate.
1.4 Related Work
Moulin [30] showed that cross-monotonicity is a sufficient condition to ob-
tain group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. He also shows that it is
a necessary condition for submodular cost functions. Immorlica et al. [21]
gave a partial characterization of group-strategyproof cost sharing mecha-
nisms. Pountourakis and Vidali [34] recently gave a complete characterization
of group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms and thereby settled a major
open problem. They showed that group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms
are completely characterized by a certain fence monotonicity property in com-
bination with a stable allocation rule and a valid tie-breaking rule (see [34] for
definitions). It remains open whether this characterization result can be used
algorithmically in general.
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Moulin and Shenker [31] showed that the Shapley value cost sharing mech-
anism minimizes the overall welfare loss among all group-strategyproof cost
sharing mechanisms for submodular cost functions. Dutta and Ray [12] and
Jain and Vazirani [24] gave a cross-monotonic and budget balanced cost-
sharing method for the submodular cost-sharing problem based on a primal-
dual algorithm.
Pa´l and Tardos [33] gave a cross-monotonic and 3-budget balanced cost-
sharing method for the metric facility location problem. Their cost-sharing
method is based on a primal-dual interpretation of the approximation algo-
rithm by Mettu and Plaxton [29].
The problem of computing prize-collecting Steiner trees or forests is APX-
complete [4,6], and hence neither of the two problems admits a PTAS un-
less P = NP. The first constant-factor approximation for the prize-collecting
Steiner tree problem is a 3-approximation algorithm by Bienstock et al. [7]
based on LP-rounding. Goemans and Williamson [16] obtain an improved
(2 − 1k )-approximation algorithm using the primal-dual schema. The current
best approximation algorithm for the problem is a 1.9672-approximation al-
gorithm due to Archer et al. [2].
One can easily modify the algorithm of Bienstock et al. [7] to give a 3-
approximation for the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem as well. Haji-
aghayi and Jain [20] refine the LP-rounding idea of Bienstock et al. and ob-
tain an LP-based 2.54-approximation algorithm for the problem. The authors
also present a primal-dual combinatorial 3-approximation algorithm for the
problem. This algorithm substantially deviates from the classical framework
of Goemans and Williamson, requiring crucial use of Farkas’ Lemma, wherein
the dual variables are both increased and decreased throughout the execution
of the algorithm.
1.5 Organization of the Paper
We introduce some additional notation in Section 2. Our lifting technique is
the subject of Section 3. Subsequently, we use this technique to derive Moulin
mechanisms for the prize-collecting variants of submodular cost-sharing, met-
ric facility location and Steiner forest problems in Sections 4, 5 and 6, respec-
tively. Finally, we prove the social cost approximation of the Moulin mechanism
in [27] for the Steiner forest problem in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
We use the following notation throughout the paper. Let U be the set of
players. The number of players in U is denoted by k = |U |. Further, let C :
2U → R+ be a non-negative cost function on U that assigns to each subset
S ⊆ U a cost C(S). The interpretation is that C(S) refers to the cost of
optimally serving the players in S. In particular, if the cost function C is
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defined implicitly by some underlying optimization problem, then C(S) refers
to the cost of an optimal solution to the problem with player set S. We assume
that C is non-decreasing, i.e., for every S ⊆ T , C(S) ≤ C(T ), and C(∅) = 0.
For every n ∈ N, we use [n] to refer to the set {1, . . . , n}.
Every player i ∈ U specifies a non-negative bid bi that he is willing to
pay for the service. A cost sharing mechanism M takes the bids (bi)i∈U of all
players as input and computes a set SM ⊆ U of players that receive service
and a non-negative payment pi for every player i ∈ SM ; we implicitly assume
that pi = 0 for every i /∈ SM .
We require that a cost sharing mechanism satisfies the following three
conditions:
– Individual Rationality : A player is charged only if he receives service and
his payment is at most his bid, i.e., pi = 0 if i /∈ SM and pi ≤ bi if i ∈ SM .
– No Positive Transfers: A player is not paid for receiving the service, i.e.,
pi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ SM .
– Consumer Sovereignty : A player is guaranteed to receive service if he is
willing to bid high enough, i.e., there exists a threshold value b∗i for every
player i ∈ U such that i ∈ SM for all bi ≥ b∗i .
Every player has a private non-negative valuation vi for receiving the ser-
vice. The utility ui of player i is defined as ui = vi − pi if i ∈ SM and ui = 0
otherwise. We assume that every player’s goal is to maximize his utility ui. We
say that M is strategyproof if bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy for ev-
ery player. We assume that players can form coalitions in order to coordinate
their bids. A mechanism M is group-strategyproof if no coordinated bidding
of a coalition T ⊆ U can ever strictly increase the utility of some player in T
without strictly decreasing the utility of another player in T .
A cost sharing mechanism M is β-budget balanced if the output set SM
and payments (pi)i∈U satisfy
1
β
C(SM ) ≤
∑
i∈SM
pi ≤ C(SM ) (1)
The requirement expressed by the first inequality is also called β-cost recovery
and the second one is called competitiveness.
Remark 1 We use the β-budget balance definition in (1) throughout the paper.
However, it is not hard to verify that all our mechanisms satisfy the stronger
β-cost recovery condition that at least 1/β of the cost of the (not necessarily
optimal) solution computed by the mechanism is recovered.
2.1 Moulin Mechanisms
A cost-sharing method ξ is an algorithm that, given any subset S ⊆ U of
players, computes a solution to service S and for each i ∈ S determines a
non-negative cost share ξi(S). In subsequent sections, we sometimes define
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ξ without explicit reference to the given player set S and instead define the
algorithm for an arbitrary player set U ; no confusion should arise.
We say that ξ is β-budget balanced if for every S ⊆ U
1
β
· C(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
ξi(S) ≤ C(S).
We call ξ simply budget balanced if it is 1-budget balanced. A cost-sharing
method ξ is cross-monotonic if for any two sets S and T such that S ⊆ T and
any player i ∈ S we have ξi(S) ≥ ξi(T ).
Moulin [30] showed that, given a β-budget balanced and cross-monotonic
cost-sharing method ξ for the underlying problem, the following cost-sharing
mechanism M(ξ) is β-budget-balance and group-strategyproof:
1 Initialize S ← U
2 while S 6= ∅ and ∃i ∈ S with ξi(S) > bi do
3 Choose a player i ∈ S with ξi(S) > bi
4 S ← S \ {i}
5 end
6 Let SM ← S be the set of served players
7 Define pi ← ξi(S) as the payment of player i ∈ SM
8 return (SM , (pi))
Theorem 1 (Moulin Mechanisms [30]) Given a cross-monotonic and β-
budget balanced cost sharing method, the Moulin mechanism M(ξ) satisfies
individual rationality, no positive transfers and consumer sovereignty, and is
group-strategyproof and β-budget balanced.
The following fact summarizes an important property of Moulin mecha-
nisms (see also [30,32]).
Fact 2 (Order Invariance Property) Given a cross-monotonic cost-
sharing method ξ, the final set SM of players output by the Moulin mechanism
M(ξ) is independent of the order of eviction.
2.2 Social Cost Approximation
Roughgarden and Sundararajan [38] introduced an alternative notion of effi-
ciency for cost-sharing mechanisms: For a set S ⊆ U , define v(S) = ∑i∈S vi.
Define the social cost Π(S) of a set S ⊆ U as
Π(S) = v(U \ S) + C(S).
Note that the social cost of a set S ⊆ U is evaluated with respect to the optimal
servicing cost C(S). A cost-sharing mechanism M is said to be α-approximate
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if, assuming that every player i ∈ U bids truthfully bi = vi, the final set SM
output by M satisfies
Π(SM ) ≤ α ·Π(S) ∀S ⊆ U. (2)
Roughgarden and Sundararajan [38] showed that the approximation guar-
antee of a Moulin mechanism M(ξ) is intimately related to the summability of
the cost sharing method ξ, which is defined as follows: Assume we are given an
arbitrary permutation σ on the players in U and a subset S ⊆ U of players. We
assume that the players in S are ordered according to σ, i.e., S = {i1, . . . , i|S|}
where ij ≺σ ik if and only if 1 ≤ j < k ≤ |S|. We define Sj ⊆ S as the (or-
dered) set of the first j players of S according to the order σ. A cost-sharing
method ξ is α-summable if for every ordering σ and every subset S ⊆ U
|S|∑
j=1
ξij (Sj) ≤ α · C(S). (3)
Theorem 3 (Social Cost Approximation [38]) Let ξ be a cross-
monotonic and β-budget balanced cost sharing method that is α-summable.
Then the Moulin mechanism M(ξ) is (α+ β − 1)-approximate with respect to
social cost.
Roughgarden and Sundararajan [38] actually showed that the summability
of ξ relates to several efficiency measures for M(ξ) such as additive welfare loss,
social cost, social reward and social welfare, with social cost being just one of
them. However, here we focus on the social cost approximation guarantee as
defined in (2) and refer to [38] for more details.
3 Lifting Technique
We present a general lifting technique to prove bounds on the social cost
approximation guarantee of Moulin mechanisms for prize-collecting problems.
Suppose we are given a set of players U and a non-negative cost function
C¯ : 2U → R+, where C¯(S) is the cost of serving the players in S ⊆ U . The
cost function C¯ is defined implicitly by an underlying optimization problem
P¯, i.e., C¯(S) is defined as the cost of an optimal solution of P¯ for player set
S ⊆ U . We refer to P¯ as the non-prize collecting problem.
We generalize P¯ to its prize-collecting variant P as follows. Suppose every
player i ∈ U has a non-negative penalty pi(i). Given a subset S ⊆ U , there are
two possibilities to serve each player i ∈ S: either i becomes part of a group
T ⊆ S whose members share the common cost C¯(T ) or i is served individually
at a cost of pi(i). Put differently, the cost function C of the corresponding
prize-collecting problem P is defined as
C(S) = min
T⊆S
(
C¯(T ) +
∑
i∈S\T
pi(i)
)
.
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Assume that we have a Moulin mechanism M(ξ¯) for the non-prize-
collecting problem P¯, driven by a cross-monotonic cost sharing method ξ¯.
Then, basically, our approach allows us to lift the approximation guarantee of
M(ξ¯) for the non-prize-collecting problem P¯ to a Moulin mechanism M(ξ) for
the prize-collecting problem P. Our approach applies naturally to primal-dual
cost-sharing methods, where cost shares relate to dual values that are grown
over time. Subsequently, we use ξ¯τ and ξτ to refer to the cost shares at time
τ for problems P¯ and P, respectively.
The main result of this section is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (Lifting Theorem) Let ξ be a cross-monotonic and β-budget
balanced cost-sharing method for a prize-collecting problem P. Further, let ξ¯ be
a cross-monotonic cost-sharing method such that M(ξ¯) is α-approximate for
the corresponding non-prize-collecting problem P¯. Then the Moulin mechanism
M(ξ) is (1 + α)β-approximate for P if ξ satisfies the following two properties
for every S ⊆ U :
1. For every player i ∈ S, ξi(S) ≤ pi(i).
2. Let τ0 be the first point of time τ at which ξ
τ
i (S) = pi(i) for some player
i ∈ S; let τ0 =∞ if no such time exists. Then for every player j ∈ S
ξτj (S) = ξ¯
τ
j (S) ∀τ ∈ [0, τ0).
Our Lifting Theorem gives rise to the following general design template to
derive a Moulin mechanism M(ξ) for a prize-collecting problem P:
1. Let M(ξ¯) be an α-approximate Moulin mechanism for the non-prize col-
lecting problem P¯, driven by a cross-monotonic cost sharing method ξ¯ that
grows cost shares over time.
2. Derive a cost-sharing method ξ for P by adapting ξ¯ such that Properties 1
and 2 of the Lifting Theorem are satisfied.
A natural way to accomplish Property 1 is to simply “freeze” the cost
share of a player i as soon as he reaches his penalty pi(i). Typically, this
also ensures that Property 2 holds because both cost-sharing methods ξ¯
and ξ progress in exactly the same way until time τ0, when the first player
reaches his penalty.
3. Prove that the resulting cost-sharing method ξ is cross-monotonic and β-
budget balanced.
4. Conclude that M(ξ) is a (1 + α)β-approximate and β-budget balanced
Moulin mechanism for the prize-collecting problem P.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.
3.1 Decomposition Lemma
Given a subset S ⊆ U of players, we use C|S to refer to the restriction of C to
S, i.e., C|S : 2S → R+ with C|S(T ) = C(T ) for all T ⊆ S. Similarly, we use
ξ|S to refer to the restriction of ξ to S.
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The following lemma will turn out to be crucial to prove Theorem 4.
Lemma 1 (Decomposition Lemma) Consider a universe U of players,
along with a non-decreasing cost function C and a β-budget balanced and cross-
monotonic cost-sharing method ξ. Given a partition of U into two parts U1
and U2, if the Moulin mechanism on sub-universe Uj is αj-approximate for
all j ∈ {1, 2} with respect to the induced cost-sharing method ξ|Uj and the cost
function C|Uj , then the Moulin mechanism is (α1 + α2)β-approximate for the
entire set U with respect to ξ and C.
Proof Let A be the final set of players returned by the Moulin mechanism when
run on U . Since ξ satisfies β-cost recovery, we have C(A) ≤ β∑i∈A ξi(A) and
hence,
Π(A) = C(A) + v(U \A) ≤
∑
i∈A
β ξi(A) +
∑
i∈U\A
vi. (4)
Define Aj = A ∩ Uj as the set of players in Uj that were accepted by the
Moulin mechanism when run on U for j ∈ {1, 2}. Consider a run of the Moulin
mechanism on Uj and let Bj be the final set of players for j ∈ {1, 2}.
Claim Bj ⊆ Aj for all j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof Let e1, . . . , ep be the elements in Uj \Aj in the order in which they are
dropped in the Moulin mechanism when run on U . Assume for the sake of
contradiction that Bj 6⊆ Aj . Then there exists some l ∈ [p] such that el ∈ Bj .
Choose l as the smallest index with this property and let i = el. Let S be the
set of players that are still part of the game in the Moulin run on U just before
i is dropped. Note that by the choice of l we have S ⊇ {el, . . . , ep} ∪Aj ⊇ Bj .
Thus
vi < ξi(S) ≤ ξi({el, . . . , ep} ∪Aj) ≤ ξi(Bj),
where the last two inequalities use the cross-monotonicity of ξ. This contradicts
the fact that i = el is part of the final set Bj of the Moulin run on Uj . uunionsq
Notice that the cost share ξi(A) of a player i ∈ Aj \ Bj is at most the
valuation vi of player i by the termination condition of the Moulin mechanism.
For a set Sj ⊆ Uj , define Πj(Sj) = C(Sj) + v(Uj \ Sj). As Bj is an αj-
approximate set of players, we then have Πj(Bj) ≤ αjΠj(Sj) for any set
Sj ⊆ Uj .
Using (4), we can now upper bound Π(A) as follows:
Π(A) = C(A) + v(U \A) ≤
∑
i∈A
β ξi(A) +
∑
i∈U\A
vi
=
( ∑
i∈A1
β ξi(A) +
∑
i∈U1\A1
vi
)
+
( ∑
i∈A2
β ξi(A) +
∑
i∈U2\A2
vi
)
. (5)
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We upper-bound the first of the two parentheses on the right-hand side of
the above inequality. An upper bound for the second parentheses is obtained
analogously.∑
i∈A1
β ξi(A) +
∑
i∈U1\A1
vi =
∑
i∈B1
β ξi(A) +
∑
i∈A1\B1
β ξi(A) +
∑
i∈U1\A1
vi (6)
≤
∑
i∈B1
β ξi(A) +
∑
i∈A1\B1
β vi +
∑
i∈U1\A1
vi (7)
≤
∑
i∈B1
β ξi(B1) +
∑
i∈U1\B1
β vi (8)
≤ β C(B1) +
∑
i∈U1\B1
β vi (9)
= β Π1(B1). (10)
Inequality (7) uses the fact that player i ∈ A1 \ B1 is part of the final set of
players returned by the Moulin mechanism when run on U1, and hence must
have valuation at least its cost share. We then use cross-monotonicity of ξ and
the fact that β ≥ 1 to get (8). Inequality (9) uses the competitiveness of ξ,
and the final inequality follows from the definition of Π1. Using the resulting
inequality together with (5) yields
Π(A) ≤ β (Π1(B1) +Π2(B2)) ≤ β(α1Π1(S1) + α2Π2(S2)) (11)
for any S1 ⊆ U1, S2 ⊆ U2, where we use the fact that the Moulin mechanism
when run on Uj is αj-approximate for j ∈ {1, 2}.
Finally, for any set S ⊆ U and for j ∈ {1, 2}, define Sj = S∩Uj . Note that
since C is non-decreasing, Πj(Sj) = C(Sj) + v(Uj \ Sj) ≤ C(S) + v(U \ S) =
Π(S). Putting these together with (11), we get that Π(A) ≤ (α1 +α2)βΠ(S)
for any S ⊆ U , and hence the Moulin mechanism is (α1 + α2)β-approximate.
uunionsq
3.2 Partitioning the Players
Armed with the above lemma, let us consider the universe of players U for an
instance of P and divide them into two parts as follows:
– The “high-valuation” set U1 are those players i ∈ U with valuation vi ≥
pi(i).
– The “low-valuation” set U2 are the remaining players i ∈ U with vi < pi(i).
We now show that ξ on the sub-universes U1 and U2 is 1-approximate and
α-approximate, respectively. This together with the Decomposition Lemma
and the fact that ξ is β-budget balanced proves that M(ξ) is (1 + α)β-
approximate.
We first prove the following High-Valuation Lemma:
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Lemma 2 (High-Valuation Lemma) The mechanism M(ξ) is 1-
approximate when restricted to the players in the high-valuation set U1.
Proof By Property 1 (Theorem 4), ξi(S) ≤ pi(i) for every set S ⊆ U and every
i ∈ S. Since vi ≥ pi(i) ≥ ξi(S) for any S ⊆ U1 and i ∈ S, the players in U1 will
never be rejected by the mechanism M(ξ) when run on U1. Moreover, the set
achieving the optimal social cost is also U1, and hence the Moulin mechanism
gives the social optimum on the high-valuation set. uunionsq
Suppose we compare the two runs M(ξ) and M(ξ¯) of the Moulin mecha-
nisms with cost-sharing methods ξ and ξ¯ with the same set of low-valuation
players S ⊆ U2. An immediate consequence of Property 2 (Theorem 4) is that
as long as some player is eliminated in either of the runs of the Moulin mech-
anisms, there must be a player that the mechanisms could eliminate in both
the runs.
Lemma 3 Fix some S ⊆ U2. Suppose there is a player j ∈ S with ξj(S) > vj
or ξ¯j(S) > vj. Then there is a player i ∈ S such that ξi(S) > vi and ξ¯i(S) > vi.
Proof Let τ0 be the first point of time τ at which ξ
τ
i (S) = pi(i) for some player
i ∈ S; τ0 = ∞ if no such time exists. The claim clearly holds if τ0 = ∞ as
all cost shares in M(ξ) and M(ξ¯) are the same. Otherwise, there exists some
player i ∈ S and some τ0 = τ such that ξτi (S) = pi(i). Property 2 (Theorem 4)
then implies that ξτi (S) = ξ¯
τ
i (S) = pi(i) > vi. uunionsq
The next lemma essentially shows that the penalties pi(i) play no role for
the low-valuation players U2.
Lemma 4 When starting with a set of low-valuation players U2, the final
output SM(ξ) ⊆ U2 of the Moulin mechanism M(ξ) is identical to the output
SM(ξ¯) ⊆ U2 of the Moulin mechanism M(ξ¯).
Proof Lemma 3 states that we can always identify a player i ∈ S that we may
evict in both runs of M(ξ) and M(ξ¯) as long as some player is eliminated in
either of the runs of the Moulin mechanism. We can then eliminate player i
in both the runs and use induction to show that both runs end with the same
players if we make the right choices. However, Fact 2 implies that any choices
would lead to the same outputs, as we claim. uunionsq
We can now prove the following Low-Valuation Lemma:
Lemma 5 (Low-Valuation Lemma) Restricting our attention to the low-
valuation set U2, the mechanism M(ξ) is α-approximate if the mechanism
M(ξ¯) is α-approximate.
Proof On the low-valuation players, the solution with the optimal social cost
for M(ξ) would never service a player i by paying her penalty pi(i), since it
would be better to reject the player and pay vi < pi(i). This implies that the
optimal social cost Π∗ for P and the optimal social cost Π¯∗ for P¯ are the
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same on U2. Also note that for every player set S the cost C(S) of an optimal
solution for P is at most the cost C¯(S) of an optimal solution for P¯. Let Π
and Π¯ denote the social cost with respect to P and P¯, respectively. Given
these facts together with the fact that M(ξ) and M(ξ¯) output the same set
SM on the low-valuation instances, we conclude that
Π(SM ) = v(U2 \ SM ) + C(SM ) ≤ v(U2 \ SM ) + C¯(SM )
= Π¯(SM ) ≤ α · Π¯∗ = α ·Π∗.
Here the last inequality follows because M(ξ¯) is α-approximate. uunionsq
4 Submodular Cost Sharing Problems with Penalties
As a first application, we consider the submodular cost-sharing problem with
penalties (PSC). We are given a set U of players with penalties pi : U → R+
and a cost function c : 2U → R which is submodular1, i.e.,
∀S, T ⊆ U : c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ) + c(S ∩ T ). (12)
A feasible solution is a partition of the player set U into sets S and P = U \S.
The players in S incur a total cost of c(S) and each player i ∈ P incurs a cost
equal to the penalty pi(i). The goal is to determine a partition (S, P ) such that
the total cost c(S) + pi(P ) is minimized.
Submodular costs constitute an important class of cost functions. Several
natural cost-sharing problems exhibit a cost function that is submodular. For
example, in the fixed tree multicast problem we are given a tree T = (V,E)
with root node r and edge costs c : E → R+. Each player i ∈ U is uniquely
associated with a node ui in V . The cost c(S) to serve a subset S ⊆ V is
defined as the cost
∑
e∈T ′ c(e) of the smallest subtree T
′ of T that contains
all of nodes in S. It is not hard to verify that c is submodular.
Dutta and Ray [12] and Jain and Vazirani [24] gave a cross-monotonic
and budget balanced cost-sharing method ξSC for the submodular cost-sharing
problem. The cost-sharing method in [24] is derived via a primal-dual algo-
rithm which also constitutes the basis of our approach here. It is shown implic-
itly by Bleischwitz et al. in [9] that the resulting Moulin mechanism M(ξSC)
is 2Hk-approximate.
2
Here we adapt the cross-monotonic cost-sharing method ξSC of Jain and
Vazirani [24] and obtain a cross-monotonic and budget balanced cost-sharing
method ξPSC for the submodular cost-sharing problem with penalties. With the
help of our Lifting Theorem we will then be able to show that the resulting
Moulin mechanism M(ξPSC) is (2Hk + 1)-approximate. In summary, the result
proven in this section is as follows.
1 An equivalent definition of submodularity is that c has non-increasing marginal costs,
i.e., for every player i ∈ U and every set S ⊆ T ⊆ U \{i}, c(S∪{i})−c(S) ≥ c(T∪{i})−c(T ).
2 This follows from Theorem 4 in [9] and the observation that for submodular cost func-
tions their egalitarian mechanism coincides with the Moulin mechanism M(ξSC).
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Theorem 5 There is a Moulin mechanism for the submodular cost-sharing
problem with penalties that is budget balanced and (2Hk + 1)-approximate.
This result is almost best possible: Roughgarden and Sundararajan [37]
showed that every budget balanced Moulin mechanism for the submodular
cost-sharing problem is no better than Hk-approximate.
4.1 LP Formulation
The following is a natural integer linear programming formulation of the sub-
modular cost-sharing problem with penalties:
min
∑
S⊆U
c(S)xS +
∑
i∈U
pi(i)zi (ILP)
s.t.
∑
S⊆U :i∈S
xS + zi ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ U (13)
xS , zi ∈ {0, 1} ∀S ⊆ U, ∀i ∈ U. (14)
Here xS and zi are decision variables: xS is equal to 1 if and only if the set
of served players is S ⊆ U and zi is set to 1 for a player i ∈ U if and only
if i ∈ P . Note that because c is submodular the sets (S, P ) induced by an
optimal solution constitute a partition of the player set U .
By relaxing the integrality constraint (14) and dualizing the resulting linear
program, we obtain the following linear program:
max
∑
i∈U
ξi (D)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
ξi ≤ c(S) ∀S ⊆ U (15)
ξi ≤ pi(i) ∀i ∈ U (16)
ξi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ U. (17)
The dual value ξi of player i ∈ U can be interpreted as the cost share of i.
Constraint (15) bounds the total cost share of all players in a set S ⊆ U to be
at most the cost c(S) of that set. We say that a set S ⊆ U is tight if and only
if
∑
i∈S ξi = c(S). Constraint (16) restricts player i’s cost share to not exceed
his penalty pi(i).
4.2 Cost Share Definition and Construction of Solution
We first derive some properties of feasible solutions to the dual linear program
(D) which we will then use to define our cost-sharing method. Most of the
proofs below follow along similar lines as the corresponding ones in [24].
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Lemma 6 ([24]) Let ξ be a feasible solution to (D). If two sets S1, S2 ⊆ U
are tight, then so is S1 ∪ S2.
Proof By submodularity of c, we have
c(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ c(S1) + c(S2)− c(S1 ∩ S2)
≤
∑
i∈S1
ξi +
∑
i∈S2
ξi −
∑
i∈S1∩S2
ξi =
∑
i∈S1∪S2
ξi.
The second inequality follows because S1 and S2 are tight, and because ξ is
feasible and thus
∑
i∈S1∩S2 ξi ≤ c(S1 ∩S2). We conclude that S1 ∪S2 is tight.uunionsq
Corollary 1 ([24]) Let ξ be a feasible solution to (D). Then there is a unique
maximal tight set, which is simply the union of all tight sets.
We next define our cost-sharing method ξPSC. Our algorithm is a natural
adaptation of the cost-sharing method ξSC given by Jain and Vazirani [24].
Basically, we extend their cost-sharing method simply by ensuring that the
dual constraint (16) is satisfied additionally. Both algorithms coincide if pii =
∞ for every i ∈ U .
Our algorithm can be seen as a process over time. Let ξτi be the cost share
of player i at time τ . We will make sure that ξτ = (ξτi )i∈U is dual feasible
throughout the execution of the algorithm. Initially, the algorithm starts with
all cost shares equal to 0, i.e., ξ0i = 0 for every i ∈ U . Let Sτ be the unique
maximal tight set at time τ . Note that Sτ exists by Corollary 1. We call a
player i ∈ U active at time τ if i is not contained in any tight set and has
not reached his penalty, i.e., i /∈ Sτ and ξτi < pi(i); otherwise, we say that i is
inactive. As time progresses, the algorithm raises the cost shares of all active
players at the same rate until either a new set becomes tight or some player i
reaches his penalty pi(i). In the former event, all players in the new maximal
tight set Sτ become inactive (some might have been inactive before). In the
latter event, player i becomes inactive. The algorithm continues in this manner
until eventually all players are inactive.
Let ξPSC = (ξPSCi )i∈U refer to the final cost shares. Let S be the unique
maximal tight set Sτ at termination of the algorithm and let P = U \S be the
set of the remaining players. Our algorithm returns (S, P ) as the final solution.
Remark 2 The algorithm can be implemented to run in polynomial time. The
only non-trivial part is to determine the unique maximal tight set Sτ . This
can be achieved by using a polynomial time algorithm for the minimization of
a submodular function [39,22]. The idea is similar to the one described in [24]:
It is not hard to verify that the function c′(S) = c(S)−∑i∈S fi is submodular,
where fi is fixed for every player i ∈ S. We set fi = ξτi if i ∈ S is inactive at
time τ and fi = τ otherwise. By doing a binary search on τ , we can then find
the smallest time τ at which there is a set S ⊆ U such that c′(S) is a small
negative number. Then S is the set that will become tight next.
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4.3 Cross-Monotonicity and Budget Balance
The next lemma shows that the cost shares correspond to a feasible dual
solution at all times.
Lemma 7 At any point of time τ , the cost shares ξτ = (ξτi ) constitute a
feasible solution to (D).
Proof Note that if a set S becomes tight at time τ then all players in S
become inactive and remain inactive at all times τ ′ > τ . Also once a player
i ∈ U reaches his penalty pi(i) at time τ , i remains inactive at all times τ ′ > τ .
Constraints (15) and (16) of the dual linear program (D) are therefore satisfied.
uunionsq
The proof that ξPSC is cross-monotonic is similar to the one in [24].
Lemma 8 The cost-sharing method ξPSC is cross-monotonic.
Proof Let U1 ⊂ U2 and consider the two runs of the algorithm on player sets
U1 and U2, respectively. Let I
τ
1 and I
τ
2 be the set of players that are inactive
at time τ in the runs on U1 and U2, respectively. A crucial property of our
algorithm is that all players that are active at time τ have the same cost share
τ . As a consequence, in order to show that ξPSC is cross-monotonic it suffices
to show that Iτ1 ⊆ Iτ2 at all times τ .
Let Sτ1 and S
τ
2 be the maximal tight sets at time τ in the runs on U1 and
U2, respectively. First note that every player i ∈ Iτ1 \ Sτ1 is inactive at time τ
in the U1-run because he reached his penalty, i.e., τ ≥ pi(i). But then i cannot
be active at time τ in the U2-run and thus i ∈ Iτ2 .
The claim now follows if we can show that Sτ1 ⊆ Sτ2 . For notational con-
venience, let S1 = S
τ
1 and S2 = S
τ
2 . Also let ξ
1 and ξ2 be the cost shares at
time τ in the runs on U1 and U2, respectively. We have
c(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ c(S1) + c(S2)− c(S1 ∩ S2) (18)
≤
∑
i∈S1
ξ1i +
∑
i∈S2
ξ2i −
∑
i∈S1∩S2
ξ1i (19)
=
∑
i∈S1\S2
ξ1i +
∑
i∈S2
ξ2i (20)
≤
∑
i∈S1∪S2
ξ2i . (21)
Here inequality (18) follows from the submodularity of c. Inequality (19) holds
because S1 and S2 are tight with respect to ξ
1 and ξ2, respectively, and ξ1 is
dual feasible. Inequality (21) follows from the fact that for every i ∈ S1 \ S2
we have ξ1i ≤ ξ2i . To see this, we distinguish two cases: (i) i is active at time
τ in the U2-run. Then ξ
2
i = τ ≥ ξ1i . (ii) i is inactive at time τ in the U2-run.
Since i /∈ S2, i must be inactive because he reached his penalty, i.e., ξ2i = pi(i).
But then ξ2i = pi(i) ≥ ξ1i .
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The above inequality implies that S1 ∪S2 is tight with respect to ξ2. Since
S2 is the maximal tight set in the U2-run, we have S1 ∪ S2 ⊆ S2 and thus
S1 ⊆ S2 which concludes the proof. uunionsq
We finally show that ξPSC is budget balanced.
Lemma 9 The cost-sharing method ξPSC is budget balanced.
Proof Let (S∗, P ∗) be an optimal solution for the given instance of the sub-
modular cost-sharing problem with penalties. Recall that by Lemma 7, ξPSC is
a feasible solution to (D). By weak duality, we obtain∑
i∈U
ξPSCi ≤ c(S∗) + pi(P ∗).
Let (S, P ) be the partition output by the algorithm. When the algorithm
terminates, the set S is tight and thus
∑
i∈S ξ
PSC
i = c(S). Moreover, for every
player i ∈ P we have ξPSCi = pi(i). Thus∑
i∈U
ξPSCi = c(S) + pi(P ).
The cost shares ξPSC are thus budget balanced. uunionsq
4.4 Social Cost Approximation
Recall that the cost-sharing method ξSC for the submodular cost-sharing prob-
lem without penalties is known to be 2Hk-approximate [9]. It is not hard to
verify that ξSC and ξPSC satisfy the two properties of our Lifting Theorem (The-
orem 4). This together with the fact that ξPSC is budget balanced proves the
following lemma.
Corollary 2 The Moulin mechanism M(ξPSC) is (2Hk + 1)-approximate.
5 Metric Facility Location Problem with Penalties
In the metric facility location problem with penalties (PFL) we are given a
universe of players U with non-negative penalties pi : U → R+, a set of facilities
F with a non-negative opening costs f : F → R+, and a metric c on F ∪ U .
The goal is to open a subset O ⊆ F of facilities and for each player i ∈ U either
connect i to the nearest open facility or pay his penalty pi(i). Let Q ⊆ U be
the subset of players for which we pay their penalties. The objective is to find
a feasible solution (O,Q) that minimizes∑
p∈O
f(p) +
∑
i/∈Q
min
p∈O
c(i, p) +
∑
i∈Q
pi(i).
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Pa´l and Tardos [33] gave a cross-monotonic and 3-budget balanced cost-
sharing method ξFL for the metric facility location problem (without penal-
ties). Their cost-sharing method is based on a primal-dual interpretation of
the approximation algorithm by Mettu and Plaxton [29]. Roughgarden and
Sundararajan [37] later showed that the Moulin mechanism M(ξFL) is (Hk+3)-
approximate, where k refers to the number of players.
We show below that the algorithm of Pa´l and Tardos can naturally be
adapted to give a cross-monotonic and 3-budget balanced cost-sharing method
ξPFL for the metric facility location problem with penalties. Using our lifting
technique introduced in Section 3, we will show that the resulting Moulin
mechanism is 3(Hk+4)-approximate. We summarize our result in the following
theorem.
Theorem 6 There is a Moulin mechanism for the metric facility location
problem with penalties that is 3-budget balanced and 3(Hk + 4)-approximate.
Note that the above budget balance and social cost approximation guar-
antees are essentially best possible: Immorlica et al. [21] showed that there is
no cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme for the metric facility location prob-
lem with budget balance factor less than 3. Moreover, Roughgarden and Sun-
dararajan [37] showed that every β-budget balanced Moulin mechanism for
the metric facility location problem cannot be better than Hk/β-approximate.
5.1 LP Formulation
The following is a natural integer linear programming formulation for the
metric facility location problem with penalties.
min
∑
p∈F
f(p)yp +
∑
i∈U
c(i, p)xip +
∑
i∈U
pi(i)zi (ILP)
s.t.
∑
p∈F
xip + zi ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ U (22)
xip ≤ yp ∀p ∈ F, ∀i ∈ U (23)
yp, xip, zi ∈ {0, 1} ∀p ∈ F, ∀i ∈ U. (24)
The interpretation of the indicator variables is as follows. Variable yp is set
to 1 if and only if facility p ∈ F is open. The indicator variable xip equals
1 if and only if player i ∈ U is assigned to facility p ∈ F . Further, zi is 1 if
player i ∈ Q and 0 otherwise. Constraint (22) ensures that every player i ∈ U
is either assigned to some facility or part of Q. Constraint (23) enforces that
a player i is assigned to a facility p only if p is open.
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By relaxing the integrality constraints (24) and dualizing the resulting
linear program we obtain:
max
∑
i∈U
ξi (D)
s.t.
∑
i∈U
κip ≤ f(p) ∀p ∈ F (25)
ξi − κip ≤ c(i, p) ∀p ∈ F, ∀i ∈ U (26)
ξi ≤ pi(i) ∀i ∈ U (27)
ξi, κip ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ F, ∀i ∈ U. (28)
We can think of ξi as being the cost share of player i ∈ U and κip as the con-
tribution of player i towards facility p ∈ F . Constraint (25) imposes that the
total contribution of all players towards a facility p does not exceed its opening
cost f(p). Constraint (26) enforces that for every facility p ∈ F the cost share
ξi of player i is at most the connection cost c(i, p) plus the contribution κip
towards p. Constraint (27) requires that the cost share ξi of each player i is at
most the penalty pi(i).
5.2 Cost Share Definition and Construction of Solution
We obtain a cross-monotonic cost-sharing method ξPFL based on the dual linear
program (D). Our cost-sharing method is similar to the cost-sharing method
ξFL of Pa´l and Tardos [33] for the metric facility location problem. In fact, for
the special case that all penalties are set to ∞ our algorithm described below
coincides with the one of Pa´l and Tardos.
We consider the algorithm as a process over time. For each player i ∈ U
we grow a ghost ball uniformly and at unit rate around i. While in [33] these
ghosts are grown to infinity, we cannot do this here because of the penalties
of the players. Instead, we will only be able to grow the ghost of i in the time
interval [0, pi(i)]. That is, the ghost of i at time τ is a ball centered at i with
radius min(τ, pi(i)).
The ghost of i touches a facility p ∈ F at time τ if c(i, p) ≤ min(τ, pi(i)).
The ghosts that touch a facility p contribute towards filling p. The contribution
of ghost i towards facility p at time τ is
κτip = max(0,min(τ, pi(i))− c(i, p)).
A facility p ∈ F is said to be full at time τ if ∑i∈U κτip ≥ f(p). Let τ(p) be
the first point of time when p becomes full; τ(p) = ∞ if no such time exists.
Further, let Sp ⊆ U be the set of players that contributed towards filling p at
time τ(p); more formally,
Sp = {i ∈ U : κτ(p)ip > 0}.
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The cost shares are defined as follows. The cost share ξPFLi of player i is
grown at unit rate until some facility it touches becomes full or i’s ghost
touches some full facility or i’s cost share equals pi(i). More formally,
ξPFLi = min
(
min
p:i∈Sp
τ(p), min
p:i/∈Sp
c(i, p), pi(i)
)
. (29)
We use the following simple rule of Mettu and Plaxton [29] to determine
which facilities are opened: Whenever a facility p ∈ F becomes full at time
τ(p), we open p if and only if there is no other facility q ∈ F within distance
c(p, q) ≤ 2τ(p) that is already open. Let O be the set of facilities that are
opened this way. Let Q be the set of players whose cost share equals their
penalties, i.e., Q = {i ∈ U : ξPFLi = pi(i)}. We assign each remaining player
i /∈ Q to his closest open facility in O.
5.3 Cross-Monotonicity
As in [33], the proof of ξPFL being cross-monotonic follows straightforwardly
from the following observation: By adding more players, each facility can only
become full earlier and thus each individual cost share can only decrease.
Lemma 10 The cost shares ξPFL are cross-monotonic.
5.4 Budget Balance
We show that the cost-sharing method ξPFL as defined above is 3-budget bal-
anced. The following lemma establishes competitiveness of ξPFL.
Lemma 11 Let (O∗, Q∗) be an optimal solution to an instance of the metric
facility location problem with penalties. The cost shares ξPFL satisfy∑
i∈U
ξPFLi ≤
∑
p∈O∗
f(p) +
∑
i/∈Q∗
min
p∈O∗
c(i, p) +
∑
i∈Q∗
pi(i).
Proof Observe that the final cost shares ξPFLi together with their contributions
κip constitute a feasible dual solution to (D). The lemma simply follows by
weak duality. uunionsq
The following lemma shows that for any two different open facilities p and
q the corresponding contributor sets Sp and Sq are disjoint (see also [33]).
Lemma 12 If facilities p and q, p 6= q, are both open, then their contributor
sets Sp and Sq are disjoint.
Proof Let τ(p) ≥ τ(q). For contradiction, assume that there is some player i ∈
Sp∩Sq. Then c(i, p) ≤ min(τ(p), pi(i)) and c(i, q) ≤ min(τ(q), pi(i)). Exploiting
the triangle inequality we obtain
c(p, q) ≤ c(i, p) + c(i, q) ≤ τ(p) + τ(q) ≤ 2τ(p),
which is a contradiction to p being open. uunionsq
22 A. Gupta, J. Ko¨nemann, S. Leonardi, R. Ravi and G. Scha¨fer
Consider an open facility p ∈ O. We first bound the opening cost of p plus
the total cost of connecting all players in Sp to p. Throughout the analysis we
overestimate the connection cost of all players i ∈ Sp \ Q by assuming that
they are assigned to p (instead of their closest open facility). At time τ(p)
when p is opened, we have
f(p) =
∑
i∈Sp
κ
τ(p)
ip =
∑
i∈Sp
min(τ(p), pi(i))− c(i, p)
≤
∑
i∈Sp∩Q
ξPFLi +
∑
i∈Sp\Q
min(τ(p), pi(i))−
∑
i∈Sp
c(i, p), (30)
where the inequality follows because ξPFLi = pi(i) for every i ∈ Q.
Lemma 13 Let p be an open facility and let i ∈ Sp \ Q. Then ξPFLi ≥
1
3 min(τ(p), pi(i)).
Proof For the sake of a contradiction assume that ξPFLi <
1
3 min(τ(p), pi(i)).
Let q be the first full facility that i touches, i.e., ξPFLi ≥ c(i, q) and ξPFLi ≥ τ(q).
Note that q must exist because i /∈ Q. Recall that c(i, p) ≤ min(τ(p), pi(i))
because i ∈ Sp. Exploiting the triangle inequality, we obtain
c(p, q) ≤ c(i, p) + c(i, q) ≤ min(τ(p), pi(i)) + ξPFLi < 2 min(τ(p), pi(i)) ≤ 2τ(p)
and thus q cannot be open. But then there must exist a facility q′ that pre-
vented q from being opened at time τ(q), i.e., c(q, q′) ≤ 2t(q) ≤ 2ξPFLi . Observe
that q′ 6= p because τ(q′) ≤ τ(q) ≤ ξPFLi < τ(p). We obtain
c(p, q′) ≤ c(i, p) + c(i, q) + c(q, q′) ≤ min(τ(p), pi(i)) + 3ξPFLi
< 2 min(τ(p), pi(i)) ≤ 2τ(p),
which is a contradiction to p being open. uunionsq
Exploiting inequality (30) and Lemma 13, we obtain for every open facility
p ∈ O
f(p) +
∑
i∈Sp
c(i, p) ≤
∑
i∈Sp∩Q
ξPFLi + 3
∑
i∈Sp\Q
ξPFLi . (31)
We also need to bound the connection costs of all players i /∈ Q that do
not belong to any contributor set of an open facility. Define R = ∪p∈OSp.
Lemma 14 Consider a player i /∈ Q ∪R. Then ξPFLi ≥ 13 minp∈O c(i, p).
Proof Let q be the first full facility that i touches, i.e., ξPFLi ≥ c(i, q) and
ξPFLi ≥ τ(q). Note that q must exist because i /∈ Q. If q is open, then the claim
follows because ξPFLi ≥ c(i, q). If q is not open then there must exist a facility
q′ that prevented q from being opened and thus c(q, q′) ≤ 2τ(q). We obtain
c(i, q′) ≤ c(i, q) + c(q, q′) ≤ ξPFLi + 2τ(q) ≤ 3ξPFLi ,
which concludes the proof. uunionsq
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Lemma 15 Let (O,Q) be the solution computed by the above algorithm. The
cost shares ξPFL satisfy∑
i∈U
ξPFLi ≥
1
3
(∑
p∈O
f(p) +
∑
i/∈Q
min
p∈O
c(i, p) +
∑
i∈Q
pi(i)
)
.
Proof By exploiting inequality (31), we obtain∑
p∈O
(
f(p) +
∑
i∈Sp
c(i, p)
)
≤
∑
p∈O
( ∑
i∈Sp∩Q
ξPFLi + 3
∑
i∈Sp\Q
ξPFLi
)
(32)
Since ξPFLi = pi(i) for every i ∈ Q, we have∑
i∈Q
pi(i) =
∑
i∈Q
ξPFLi . (33)
By Lemma 14, we can bound the connection costs of all players in U\(Q∪R)
by ∑
i/∈Q∪R
min
p∈O
c(i, p) ≤ 3
∑
i/∈Q∪R
ξPFLi . (34)
Combining (32), (33) and (34) we obtain that the total cost of the solution
(O,Q) is at most
2
∑
i∈Q
ξPFLi + 3
∑
i/∈Q
ξPFLi ≤ 3
∑
i∈U
ξPFLi ,
which concludes the proof. uunionsq
5.5 Social Cost Approximation
It is easy to verify that our cost-sharing method ξPFL extending the cost-sharing
method ξFL of Pa´l and Tardos [33] satisfies Properties 1 and 2 of the Lifting
Theorem (Theorem 4). Roughgarden and Sundararajan [37] showed that the
Moulin mechanism M(ξFL) is (Hk + 3)-approximate, where k refers to the
number of players. By our Lifting Theorem and the fact that ξPFL is 3-budget
balanced, we conclude that M(ξPFL) is 3(Hk + 4)-approximate.
Corollary 3 The Moulin mechanism M(ξPFL) is 3(Hk + 4)-approximate.
6 Prize-Collecting Steiner Forest Problem
In the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem (PCSF) we are given an undi-
rected graph G = (V,E) with edge costs c : E → R+, a set of k terminal pairs
R = {(si, ti)}i∈[k], and penalties pi : R → R+. A feasible solution (F,Q) con-
sists of a forest F and a subset Q of terminal pairs such that for all (si, ti) ∈ R
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either si and ti are connected by F or (si, ti) ∈ Q. The objective is to com-
pute a feasible solution (F,Q) of minimum cost c(F ) + pi(Q). Subsequently,
we identify the set U of players with the terminal pairs in R.
Ko¨nemann et al. [27] gave a cross-monotonic and 2-budget balanced cost-
sharing method ξSF for the Steiner forest problem (without penalties). Their
algorithm is based on the primal-dual Steiner forest algorithm of Agrawal,
Klein and Ravi [1], but requires some non-trivial adaptations to ensure cross-
monotonicity. In particular, the dual solution constructed by the algorithm is
in general not feasible. Chawla et al. [11] showed that the cost-sharing method
ξSF is also O(log2 k)-approximate. A simple proof that they are O(log3 k)-
approximate is given in Section 7.
Here we extend the algorithm of Ko¨nemann et al. [27] and derive a cross-
monotonic and 3-budget balanced cost-sharing method ξPSF for the prize-
collecting Steiner forest problem. Applying the Lifting Theorem, we will be
able to show that the resulting Moulin mechanism is O(log2 k)-approximate.
Theorem 7 There is a Moulin mechanism M(ξPSF) for the prize-collecting
Steiner forest problem that is 3-budget balanced and O(log2 k)-approximate.
Note that these bounds are almost best possible: Ko¨nemann et al. [27]
showed that there is no cross-monotonic cost-sharing method that achieves a
budget balance factor better than 2 for the Steiner tree problem. Moreover,
Roughgarden and Sundararajan [37] showed that every constant budget bal-
anced Moulin mechanism for the Steiner tree problem cannot be better than
Ω(log2 k)-approximate.
Hajiaghayi and Jain [20] gave a combinatorial 3-approximation algorithm
for prize-collecting Steiner forest problem. Our algorithm is also combinatorial
and achieves the same approximation guarantee. The following corollary might
therefore be of independent interest.
Corollary 4 There is a combinatorial 3-approximation algorithm for the
prize-collecting Steiner forest problem.
6.1 LP Formulation
We assume that every node u ∈ V belongs to at most one terminal pair in
R. Note that this is without loss of generality because we can simply replace
each node u ∈ V that is contained in l ≥ 2 terminal pairs by l copies, one for
each terminal pair, which are all connected by zero cost edges. We use V (R)
to denote the set of terminal nodes in R. For a terminal u ∈ V (R), let u¯ be
the mate of u, i.e., (u, u¯) ∈ R.
Consider a cut S ⊆ V . We say S separates a terminal pair (u, u¯) ∈ R if
and only if |{u, u¯} ∩ S| = 1. We also write (u, u¯)  S if and only if (u, u¯) is
separated by S. A cut S that separates at least one terminal pair is called a
Steiner cut. Let S denote the set of all Steiner cuts. For a cut S ⊆ V , we use
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δ(S) to refer to the set of edges (u, v) ∈ E that cross S, i.e., δ(S) = {(u, v) ∈
E : |{u, v} ∩ S| = 1}.
A natural integer programming formulation for the prize-collecting Steiner
forest problem is as follows:
min
∑
e∈E
c(e) · xe +
∑
(u,u¯)∈R
pi(u, u¯) · zuu¯ (ILP)
s.t.
∑
e∈δ(S)
xe + zuu¯ ≥ 1 ∀S ∈ S, ∀(u, u¯) S (35)
xe, zuu¯ ∈ {0, 1} ∀e ∈ E, ∀(u, u¯) ∈ R.
We have a decision variable xe for every edge e ∈ E and a decision variable
zuu¯ for every terminal pair (u, u¯) ∈ R: xe = 1 if and only if e ∈ F and zuu¯ = 1
if and only if (u, u¯) ∈ Q. Constraint (35) ensures that each Steiner cut S ∈ S
is either crossed by an edge of F , or all separated terminal pairs (u, u¯)S are
part of Q.
In the dual of the linear programming relaxation (LP) of (ILP) we have
a non-negative dual variable ξS,uu¯ for every Steiner cut S ∈ S and every pair
(u, u¯) ∈ R with (u, u¯) S:
max
∑
S∈S
∑
(u,u¯)S
ξS,uu¯ (D)
s.t.
∑
S∈S:e∈δ(S)
∑
(u,u¯)S
ξS,uu¯ ≤ c(e) ∀e ∈ E (36)
∑
S∈S:S(u,u¯)
ξS,uu¯ ≤ pi(u, u¯) ∀(u, u¯) ∈ R (37)
ξS,uu¯ ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ S, (u, u¯) S.
It is convenient to associate a dual solution (ξS,uu¯)S∈S,(u,u¯)S of (D) with
dual values (yS)S∈S for all Steiner cuts S ∈ S. To this aim, we define the dual
yS of a Steiner cut S ∈ S simply as the total cost share of all its separated
terminal pairs:
yS =
∑
(u,u¯)S
ξS,uu¯.
We can think of ξS,uu¯, (u, u¯)  S, as the cost share that terminal pair (u, u¯)
receives from dual yS of S. Define the total cost share of (u, u¯) as
ξuu¯ =
∑
S∈S:S(u,u¯)
ξS,uu¯.
Constraint (36) of the linear program (D) then requires that for every edge
e ∈ E the total dual of all Steiner cuts S ∈ S that cross e is at most the
cost c(e) of this edge. We call an edge e ∈ E tight if (36) holds with equality.
Constraint (37) states that the total cost share ξuu¯ of terminal pair (u, u¯) is
at most its penalty pi(u, u¯).
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6.2 Cost Share Definition and Construction of Solution
We obtain a cross-monotonic cost sharing method ξPSF based on the dual linear
program (D). Our cost-sharing method generalizes the cost-sharing method by
Ko¨nemann et al. [27] for the Steiner forest problem. Both algorithms coincide
if the penalties are set to ∞.
The algorithm grows dual values of certain cuts and distributes this growth
among the terminal pairs. A subtle point of our algorithm is that the dual so-
lution generated by the algorithm may be infeasible for (D). As a consequence,
proving that the resulting cost-sharing method ξPSF satisfies competitiveness
is more involved (see Lemma 17 below) because it does not simply follow from
weak duality.
There are two reasons that cause the infeasibility of the dual solution:
1. We also raise dual values yS of cuts S ⊆ V that do not correspond to
Steiner cuts. A terminal pair (u, u¯) may therefore receive cost share ξS,uu¯
from a non-Steiner cut S ⊆ V .
2. A terminal pair (u, u¯) may also receive cost share ξS,uu¯ from a cut S that
does not separate (u, u¯).
However, our algorithm maintains the invariant that a terminal pair (u, u¯)
only receives cost share ξS,uu¯ from a cut S ⊆ V that either separates or entirely
contains (u, u¯), i.e., (u, u¯) S or {u, u¯} ⊆ S.
Our algorithm PSF can be described as a process over time. At time τ = 0,
xτe = 0 for every edge e ∈ E, zτuu¯ = 0 for every terminal pair (u, u¯) ∈ R and
yτS = 0 for every S ⊆ V .3 We use ξτuu¯ to refer to the cost share of terminal
pair (u, u¯) at time τ .
Let F τ be the forest at time τ that corresponds to (xτe )e∈E , i.e.,
F τ = {e ∈ E : xτe = 1}.
Similarly, let Qτ be the set of all terminal pairs (u, u¯) ∈ R such that zτuu¯ = 1.
We define F¯ τ as the set of all edges that are tight at time τ , i.e.,
F¯ τ =
{
e ∈ E :
∑
S⊆V
yτS = c(e)
}
.
It is important to realize the difference between F τ and F¯ τ : F τ represents the
partial solution at time τ and will constitute a forest at all times. F¯ τ will be
used to guide the growth of dual values. PSF maintains the invariant that only
tight edges are part of the current forest at all times, i.e., F τ ⊆ F¯ τ for every
τ ≥ 0.
We use the term moat to refer to a (maximal) connected component Mτ in
F¯ τ . Every moat Mτ induces a cut which is defined by the set of nodes V (Mτ )
3 The latter initialization is only done implicitly. The algorithm will ensure that the cuts
with positive dual value form a laminar family.
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spanned by Mτ . Let Mτ (u) denote the moat in F¯ τ that contains terminal
u ∈ V (R) at time τ .
Crucial to PSF is the notion of activity of terminal pairs: For a terminal
pair (u, u¯) ∈ R, define the death time of (u, u¯) as d(u, u¯) = 12dG(u, u¯), where
dG(u, u¯) is the cost of a shortest u, u¯-path with respect to c in G. We call a
terminal pair (u, u¯) ∈ R active at time τ if
ξτuu¯ < pi(u, u¯) and τ < d(u, u¯); (38)
otherwise, (u, u¯) is inactive at time τ . As time progresses, PSF increases (but
never decreases) the cost shares of terminal pairs. Thus once a terminal pair
becomes inactive it remains inactive. Define τuu¯ as the point of time at which
terminal pair (u, u¯) ∈ R becomes inactive.
We say that a terminal u ∈ V (R) is active at time τ if its pair (u, u¯) is
active at this time. Let Aτ be the set of all terminals that are active at time
τ . Finally, we call a moat Mτ of F¯ τ active at time τ if it contains at least one
active terminal, i.e., V (Mτ ) ∩ Aτ 6= ∅.
At time τ our algorithm PSF increases the dual values of all cuts defined
by moats Mτ in F¯ τ which are active at time τ . These duals are increased
simultaneously and by the same amount. Subsequently, we also say that we
grow all active moats in F¯ τ at time τ . Moreover, it is convenient to regard the
growing of moats as being identical to increasing the respective duals.
The growth of an active moat Mτ is shared evenly among all active termi-
nals in Mτ . More formally, we define the cost share ξτ
′
u of a terminal u ∈ V (R)
at time τ ′ as follows:
ξτ
′
u =
∫ τ ′
0
1
|V (Mτ (u)) ∩ Aτ |dτ ∀τ
′ ∈ [0, τuu¯] (39)
and ξτ
′
u = ξ
τuu¯
u for all τ
′ > τuu¯. Moreover, we define ξτuu¯ = ξ
τ
u + ξ
τ
u¯ for every
terminal pair (u, u¯) ∈ R. Observe that the total contribution to the cost share
of a terminal pair (u, u¯) within  time units is at most 2. Also, note that (u, u¯)
may receive cost share from a moat Mτ that contains u and u¯.
We say that two active moats Mτ1 and M
τ
2 collide at time τ if their nodes
are contained in the same connected component of F¯ τ
′
if and only if τ ′ ≥ τ .
In this case, PSF adds a cheapest collection of edges to F τ such that the active
nodes of Mτ1 and M
τ
2 are in the same connected component of F
τ ′ for all
τ ′ ≥ τ . Note that this way of extending the current forest F τ ensures that
only non-redundant edges are added to F τ and thus F τ remains a forest.4
Suppose a terminal pair (u, u¯) ∈ R becomes inactive at time τ = τuu¯
because it reaches its penalty, i.e., ξτuu¯ = pi(u, u¯). The algorithm then adds
(u, u¯) to Qτ . Note that it might happen that (u, u¯) is added to Qτ even though
u and u¯ are connected by F τ .
4 Note that in PSF the decision of which edges are added to F τ are delayed until these
edges are non-redundant. This is different from other primal-dual approaches for network
design problems (see, e.g., [16]) where this is ensured by a final reverse-delete step.
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PSF terminates at time τ∗ when the last terminal pair becomes inactive.
Let (F,Q) be the final solution computed by PSF. Subsequently, we use PSF to
refer to the algorithm and denote the final cost shares by ξPSF = (ξτ
∗
uu¯)(u,u¯)∈R.
The following view of the moat-growing process will be helpful to prove
some lemmas below: Consider an active moat Mτ that is grown by PSF at
time τ . Then an increase by  > 0 of the dual value yS of the induced cut
S = V (Mτ ) can be interpreted as Mτ loading all edges in δ(S) that cross
the cut S by an amount of . Note that the algorithm ensures that the total
load that an edge e ∈ E receives from different moats does not exceed its cost
c(e). This way the cost c(e) of an edge e ∈ E is partitioned among the moats
loading e and possibly some leftover piece of slack.
6.3 Some Properties of PSF
The following fact follows immediately from definitions (38) and (39).
Fact 8 For every terminal pair (u, u¯) ∈ R, ξPSFuu¯ ≤ min{pi(u, u¯), 2d(u, u¯)}.
Because at any point of time the growth of all active moats is shared among
active terminals, the following holds true.
Fact 9 For every time τ ≥ 0,∑
S⊆V
yτS =
∑
(u,u¯)∈R
ξτuu¯.
Note that a terminal pair is added to Qτ if and only if ξτuu¯ = pi(u, u¯). Thus
the following fact is immediate.
Fact 10 Let Q be the final set of terminal pairs computed by PSF. Then∑
(u,u¯)∈Q
pi(u, u¯) =
∑
(u,u¯)∈Q
ξPSFuu¯
Suppose a terminal pair (u, u¯) becomes inactive at time d(u, u¯). The next
fact shows that (u, u¯) must then be connected in F .
Fact 11 Let terminal pair (u, u¯) become inactive at time d(u, u¯). Then u and
u¯ are connected in F .
Proof Let Puu¯ be a shortest u, u¯-path in G. Note that terminals u and u¯ are
both active until time d(u, u¯). Thus all edges of Puu¯ must be tight at some
time τ ≤ d(u, u¯), i.e., Puu¯ ⊆ F¯ τ . Then either u and u¯ are already connected
in F τ or Puu¯ is added to F
τ . uunionsq
Observe that the last fact also establishes correctness of PSF: The final
solution (F,Q) computed by PSF is a feasible solution for the given prize-
collecting Steiner forest instance.
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6.4 Cross-Monotonicity
In order to show cross-monotonicity of ξPSF we compare the execution of PSF
on terminal set R with the one on terminal set R−st = R \ {(s, t)} for any
(s, t) ∈ R. We use G−st (where G is a place holder for PSF, F , F¯ , M , etc.) to
refer to G in the run of PSF on R−st. For notational convenience, throughout
this section we denote by ξ−st(u, u¯) the cost share of (u, u¯) in the run of PSF
on R−st and by ξ(u, u¯) the respective cost share in PSF on R.
Our activity notion of terminal pairs defined in (38) turns out to be crucial
to prove cross-monotonicity. As we will show below, it guarantees that if a
terminal u is active at time τ in the run of PSF−st on R−st then it will also
be active at time τ in the run of PSF on R. As a consequence, if the moat
Mτ−st(u) of u is active at time τ in PSF−st (because u is active) then also
the corresponding moat Mτ (u) is active at time τ in PSF and Mτ−st(u) ⊆
Mτ (u). Therefore, the set of edges F¯ τ−st that are tight at time τ in PSF−st is
a refinement of F¯ τ . Further, this implies that the share that u receives from
the growth of Mτ−st(u) at time τ in PSF−st is at least as large as the one it
receives from the growth of Mτ (u) in PSF.
We formalize the above observations in the following lemma.
Lemma 16 Consider the execution of PSF on R and R−st, respectively. The
following holds for every time τ ≥ 0:
1. F¯ τ−st is a refinement of F¯
τ , i.e., F¯ τ−st ⊆ F¯ τ .
2. For all (u, u¯) ∈ R−st, ξτ−st(u, u¯) ≥ ξτ (u, u¯).
Proof We prove the lemma by induction over time τ . Clearly, the lemma holds
at time τ = 0. Suppose the lemma holds at time τ .
The only moats that may potentially violate the claim F¯ τ+−st ⊆ F¯ τ+ at
time τ+ for some small  > 0, are those that are active at time τ in PSF−st. Let
M−st be a moat of F¯ τ−st that is active at time τ . By the induction hypothesis,
there exists a moat M in F¯ τ such that M−st ⊆M . We argue that M must be
active at time τ in PSF.
Since M−st is active at time τ , there exists a terminal u ∈ V (M−st) such
that pi(u, u¯)− ξτ−st(u, u¯) > 0 and τ < d(u, u¯). By our induction hypothesis,
pi(u, u¯)− ξτ (u, u¯) ≥ pi(u, u¯)− ξτ−st(u, u¯) > 0.
Therefore, M must be active at time τ too.
As a consequence, every edge e ∈ δ(S) crossing the cut S = V (M) induced
by M is loaded at least as fast in PSF as in PSF−st. Thus, if an edge e ∈ δ(S)
gets tight at time τ ′ ∈ (τ, τ + ] in PSF−st then it also gets tight at time τ ′
in PSF. Therefore, the refinement property is preserved, which proves the first
part of the lemma.
It remains to be shown that ξτ+−st (u, u¯) ≥ ξτ+(u, u¯) for all (u, u¯) ∈ R−st.
Fix an arbitrary terminal pair (u, u¯) ∈ R−st. We consider two cases:
(i) Assume (u, u¯) is inactive at time τ in PSF−st. If (u, u¯) is also inactive at
time τ in PSF the claim holds. Otherwise, (u, u¯) is active at time τ in PSF. But
then τ < d(u, u¯) and thus ξτ−st(u, u¯) = pi(u, u¯) ≥ ξτ (u, u¯). The claim holds.
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(ii) Suppose (u, u¯) is active at time τ in PSF−st. Let Mτ−st(u) be the moat
of u at time τ . By our induction hypothesis, Mτ−st(u) is contained in the
moat Mτ (u) of F¯ τ in PSF. Moreover, from the discussion above we know that
every terminal pair (v, v¯) ∈ R−st that is active at time τ in PSF−st must be
active at time τ in PSF, i.e., Aτ−st ⊆ Aτ . Therefore, |V (Mτ−st(u)) ∩ Aτ−st| ≤
|V (Mτ (u)) ∩ Aτ |. Thus, the additional cost share that (u, u¯) receives in the
time interval (τ, τ + ] in PSF−st (see (39)) is at least as large as the one it
receives in PSF. uunionsq
6.5 Competitiveness
We next show that ξPSF satisfies competitiveness. Note that this is non-trivial
here because the dual solution generated by PSF may be infeasible for (D).
The proof of the following lemma is similar to the one presented in [27].
Lemma 17 Let (F ∗, Q∗) be an optimal solution to an instance of the prize-
collecting Steiner forest problem with terminal pair set R. Then ξPSF satisfies
competitiveness, i.e., ∑
(u,u¯)∈R
ξPSFuu¯ ≤ c(F ∗) + pi(Q∗).
Proof Consider a separated terminal pair (u, u¯) ∈ Q∗. By Fact 8, we have∑
(u,u¯)∈Q∗
ξPSFuu¯ ≤ pi(Q∗).
It remains to be shown that the total cost share of all terminal pairs (u, u¯) ∈
R \Q∗ is bounded by c(F ∗).
Consider a tree T of F ∗ and let R(T ) be the set of terminal pairs that are
connected by T . We prove that∑
(u,u¯)∈R(T )
ξPSFuu¯ ≤ c(T ). (40)
The lemma follows by summing over all trees T in F ∗.
We defineMτ (T ) as the set of moats in F¯ τ at time τ that contain at least
one active terminal of V (R(T )), i.e.,
Mτ (T ) = {Mτ (u) : u ∈ V (R(T )) ∩ Aτ}.
Among all terminal pairs in R(T ), let (w, w¯) be a pair that is active longest. By
our definition of activity in (38), all terminal pairs in R(T ) are inactive after
time d(w, w¯). We show that the total growth ofMτ (T ) for all τ ∈ [0, d(w, w¯)]
is at most c(T ). This implies (40).
At any time τ , the moats in Mτ (T ) are disjoint. Moreover, T connects
all terminals in V (R(T )). Thus, if there exists a moat Mτ ∈ Mτ (T ) that
intersects an edge of T , i.e., there is some e ∈ T such that e ∈ δ(V (Mτ )),
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then each moat inMτ (T ) must intersect an edge of T ; we say that the moats
in Mτ (T ) load T . Moreover, each such moat Mτ loads a different part of T .
Thus, the total growth of moats in Mτ (T ) for all τ at which Mτ (T ) loads T
is at most c(T ).
Let τ0 ≤ d(w, w¯) be the first point of time at which Mτ0(T ) does
not load T . If Mτ0(T ) = ∅, we are done. Otherwise, we must have that
Mτ0(T ) = {Mτ0} and T ⊆ Mτ0 . The additional growth of Mτ for all times
τ ∈ [τ0, d(w, w¯)] is at most d(w, w¯) − τ0. Let Pww¯ be the unique w, w¯-path
in T . The additional growth of Mτ for all times τ ∈ [τ0, d(w, w¯)] is at most
d(w, w¯) − τ0 ≤ c(Pww¯)/2 ≤ c(T )/2. Combining this with the bound above
gives an upper bound of 32c(T ) on the total cost shares of pairs in R(T ).
We next refine the above argument to prove (40). DefineMτ−ww¯ ⊆Mτ (T )
as the set of active moats different from Mτ (w) and Mτ (w¯) that load Pww¯ at
time τ < τ0, i.e.,
Mτ−ww¯ = {Mτ ∈Mτ (T ) \ {Mτ (w),Mτ (w¯)} : δ(V (Mτ )) ∩ Pww¯ 6= ∅}.
The crucial insight is that each moat Mτ ∈Mτ−ww¯ loads at least two edges of
Pww¯ at all times τ ∈ [0, τ0). The basic idea is to use one part of this load on Pww¯
to compensate for the additional growth during the time interval [τ0, d(w, w¯)].
We make this idea more precise.
Define the degree deg(Mτ ) of a moat Mτ ∈Mτ−ww¯ as
deg(Mτ ) = |δ(V (Mτ )) ∩ Pww¯|.
Proposition 1 Consider a time τ < τ0 and a moat M
τ ∈ Mτ−ww¯. Then
deg(Mτ ) ≥ 2.
Proof Both Mτ (w) and Mτ (w¯) are active at time τ < τ0 and thus
{Mτ (w),Mτ (w¯)} ⊆ Mτ (T ) (possibly Mτ (w) = Mτ (w¯)). By definition of
Mτ−ww¯, Mτ ∈ Mτ (T ) and Mτ /∈ {Mτ (w),Mτ (w¯)}. Furthermore, Mτ is dis-
joint from all other moats in Mτ (T ). Suppose |Mτ ∩ Pww¯| = 1. But then,
moat Mτ must contain w or w¯. This contradicts the disjointness of Mτ and
{Mτ (w),Mτ (w¯)}. uunionsq
By our choice of (w, w¯) ∈ R(T ) as the terminal pair with largest activity
time and by our assumption that Mτ0(T ) 6= ∅ it follows that both, Mτ (w)
and Mτ (w¯) are active for all 0 ≤ τ ≤ τ0. We define lww¯ as the total dual
growth of the moats containing w and w¯ up to time τ0. Formally, let
δτww¯ =
{
2 if Mτ (w) 6= Mτ (w¯)
1 otherwise
and
lww¯ =
∫ τ0
0
δτww¯dτ.
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It follows that the cost c(Pww¯) of path Pww¯ is at least
lww¯ +
∫ τ0
0
∑
Mτ∈Mτ−ww¯
deg(Mτ )dτ.
We let slackww¯ be the difference between c(Pww¯) and the above term and
obtain
c(Pww¯) = lww¯ + slackww¯ +
∫ τ0
0
∑
Mτ∈Mτ−ww¯
deg(Mτ )dτ. (41)
We define the total growth yτ0(T ) produced by terminal pairs in R(T ) until
time τ0 as follows:
yτ0(T ) =
∫ τ0
0
|Mτ (T )|dτ.
At all times τ ≤ τ0, each moat in Mτ (T ) loads at least one distinct edge of
T ; those in Mτ−ww¯ load at least two edges of T . Thus, we have
c(T ) ≥ yτ0(T ) + slackww¯ +
∫ τ0
0
∑
Mτ∈Mτ−ww¯
(deg(Mτ )− 1)dτ. (42)
The additional growth between time τ0 and d(w, w¯) is at most d(w, w¯)−τ0.
Using that d(w, w¯) ≤ c(Pww¯)/2 and (41), we obtain
d(w, w¯)− τ0 ≤ lww¯
2
− τ0 + slackww¯
2
+
∫ τ0
0
∑
Mτ∈Mτ−ww¯
deg(Mτ )
2
dτ
≤ slackww¯
2
+
∫ τ0
0
∑
Mτ∈Mτ−ww¯
(deg(Mτ )− 1)dτ, (43)
where we exploit that deg(Mτ ) ≥ 2 for all Mτ ∈ Mτ−ww¯ and the fact that
lww¯ ≤ 2τ0. Combining (42) and (43) proves that the total growth yτ0(T ) +
d(w, w¯)− τ0 is at most c(T ), which concludes the proof. uunionsq
6.6 Cost Recovery
Consider a tree T which is part of the forest F τ . Let R(T ) be the set of
terminal pairs that are spanned by T . We call T active at time τ if it contains
a terminal that is active at this time, i.e., V (R(T )) ∩ Aτ 6= ∅; otherwise, T is
said to be inactive. Define the age of T as the last point of time τ0 ∈ [0, τ ]
when T was still active; more formally,
ageτ (T ) = max{τ0 ∈ [0, τ ] : V (R(T )) ∩ Aτ0 6= ∅}.
Note that ageτ (T ) = τ if T is active at time τ .
The proof of the following lemma borrows ideas from the proof of
Lemma 5.3 in [1].
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Lemma 18 For every time τ ≥ 0 and every tree T of F τ we have
c(T ) ≤ 2
∑
u∈V (R(T ))
ξτu − 2 · ageτ (T ). (44)
Proof The proof is by induction over time τ . Clearly, the claim holds at time
τ = 0. Suppose it holds at time τ . We show that the claim remains true at
time τ ′ = τ +  for some  > 0.
It is not hard to verify that the claim holds at all times τ ′ > τ for which
F τ
′
= F τ : Consider a tree T of F τ . Then the left-hand side of (44) remains the
same. If T is inactive at time τ then the right-hand side of (44) also remains
unchanged. Otherwise, T is active at time τ . But then there is a moat Mτ in
F¯ τ that contains T and whose growth is shared among all active terminals in
V (R(T )). Also, the age of T increases by the same amount. We conclude that
c(T ) ≤ 2
∑
u∈V (R(T ))
ξτu − 2 · ageτ (T ) = 2
∑
u∈V (R(T ))
ξτ
′
u − 2 · ageτ
′
(T ).
Next consider the first point of time τ ′ > τ for which F τ
′ ⊃ F τ . Because
edges are only added to the current forest, there is a tree T ′ that becomes part
of F τ
′
because two active moats, say Mτ
′
1 and M
τ ′
2 , collide at time τ
′. Then
T ′ is the union of the edges in D = F τ
′ \F τ and r inactive trees T1, . . . , Tr of
F τ (possibly r = 0). Thus,
c(T ′) = c(D) +
r∑
i=1
c(Ti)
≤ c(D) +
r∑
i=1
(
2
∑
u∈V (R(Ti))
ξτu − 2 · ageτ (Ti)
)
= c(D) +
r∑
i=1
(
2
∑
u∈V (R(Ti))
ξτ
′
u − 2 · ageτ
′
(Ti)
)
, (45)
where the first inequality holds because of the induction hypothesis and the
last equality follows from the discussion above. It is not hard to see that the
total cost of adding the edges in D to connect the active terminals in Mτ
′
1 and
Mτ
′
2 through T1, . . . , Tr is at most
2τ ′ + 2
r∑
i=1
ageτ
′
(Ti). (46)
Combining (45) and (46), we obtain
c(T ′) ≤ 2τ ′ + 2
r∑
i=1
∑
u∈V (R(Ti))
ξτ
′
u . (47)
Finally, observe that the sum of the cost shares of all terminals in Mτ
′
1 and
Mτ
′
2 is at least 2τ
′. Thus, twice the cost shares of all these terminals accounts
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for 4τ ′. Further, note that ageτ
′
(T ′) = τ ′. Combining these observations with
(47), we conclude
c(T ′) ≤ 2
∑
u∈V (R(T ′))
ξτ
′
u − 2τ ′ = 2
∑
u∈V (R(T ′))
ξτ
′
u − 2 · ageτ
′
(T ′),
which proves the claim. uunionsq
Lemma 19 Let (F,Q) be the solution computed by PSF on terminal pair set
R. Then
c(F ) + pi(Q) ≤ 3
∑
(u,u¯)∈R
ξPSFuu¯ .
Proof By Fact 10 we have
pi(Q) =
∑
(u,u¯)∈Q
ξPSFuu¯ .
Moreover, by Lemma 18 the cost of the final forest satisfies
c(F ) ≤ 2
∑
(u,u¯)∈R
ξPSFuu¯ .
Combining these bounds proves the claim. uunionsq
6.7 Social Cost Approximation
Let ξSF be the cost-sharing method by Ko¨nemann et al. [27] for the Steiner
forest problem. The only difference between our algorithm PSF and the algo-
rithm SF in [27] is the definition of the activity notion: In [27] a terminal pair
(u, u¯) is active at time τ if and only if τ < d(u, u¯). This definition coincides
with the one in (38) if pi(u, u¯) =∞ for every (u, u¯) ∈ R.
We argue that ξSF and ξPSF satisfy the two properties of our Lifting Theorem
(Theorem 4). Property 1 is satisfied by Fact 8. The following lemma shows that
Property 2 is fulfilled as well.
Lemma 20 Define τ0 as the first point of time τ at which ξ
τ,PSF
vv¯ = pi(v, v¯) for
some terminal pair (v, v¯) ∈ R; let τ0 = ∞ if no such time exists. Then for
every terminal pair (u, u¯) ∈ R and all τ ∈ [0, τ0), ξτ,PSFuu¯ = ξτ,SFuu¯ .
Proof It is sufficient to show that for all τ ∈ [0, τ0) and every terminal pair
(u, u¯) ∈ R it holds that (u, u¯) is active at time τ in PSF if and only if (u, u¯) is
active at time τ in SF.
A necessary condition for (u, u¯) being active at time τ in PSF is that τ <
d(u, u¯). Thus, (u, u¯) is active at time τ in SF if (u, u¯) is active at this time in
PSF. Next, suppose (u, u¯) is active at time τ in SF and thus τ < d(u, u¯). Since
τ < τ0, we have ξ
τ,PSF
ww¯ < pi(w, w¯) for all (w, w¯) ∈ R; in particular this also
holds for (u, u¯). Thus, (u, u¯) is active at time τ in PSF. uunionsq
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Recall that the Moulin mechanism M(ξSF) is O(log2 k)-approximate [11].
By our Lifting Theorem and the fact that ξPSF is 3-budget balanced, we con-
clude that M(ξPSF) is O(log2 k)-approximate.
Corollary 5 The Moulin mechanism M(ξPSF) is O(log2 k)-approximate.
7 Summability of Steiner Forest Cost Sharing Method
In this section, we show that the cost-sharing method ξSF of Ko¨nemann et
al. [27] for the Steiner forest problem is O(log3 k)-summable.
Theorem 12 The cost sharing method ξSF is O(log3 k)-summable.
This result is inferior to the bound ofO(log2 k) obtained by Chawla, Rough-
garden and Sundararajan [11]. However, the proof presented in this section is
simpler than the one in [11] and adds a novel methodological contribution
by showing that such a result can also be proved by embedding the graph
distances into random hierarchically separated trees (HST) [5,13].
As mentioned earlier, the algorithm SF that computes ξSF works exactly
the same way as our algorithm PSF described in the previous section if we set
all penalties to ∞. We drop the superscript SF in the discussion below.
Suppose we are given an arbitrary subset S ⊆ U and an ordering σ. We
order the terminal pairs in S according to σ and without loss of generality
assume that they are labeled such that
S = {(s1, t1), . . . , (sl, tl)}, where l = |S|.
Let Si ⊆ S be the set of the first i terminal pairs of S. We use ξi(Si) to refer
to the cost share of terminal pair (si, ti), i ∈ [l], computed by SF when run on
terminal pair set Si. We need to prove that
l∑
i=1
ξi(Si) = O(log
3 k) · C(S), (48)
where C(S) is the cost of an optimal Steiner forest cost for terminal set S.
We assume that the distance between every two nodes in G is at least 1,
i.e., dG(u, v) ≥ 1 for all u, v ∈ U . This assumption is without loss of generality
as we may scale the edge costs appropriately.
Recall that in SF each terminal pair (si, ti) ∈ U has a death time d(si, ti)
which is defined as half the distance between si and ti in G. We partition
terminal pairs in S into classes, depending on their death times: A terminal
pair (si, ti) ∈ S is of class r ≥ 0 if d(si, ti) ∈ (2r−1, 2r]. Let r(i) be the class to
which terminal pair (si, ti) belongs. We use S
r to refer to the (ordered) set of
terminal pairs in S that belong to class r. Moreover, we define Sri ⊆ Si to be
the set of class r terminal pairs in Si, i.e., S
r
i = Si ∩ Sr for every i ∈ [l]. Let
∆S be the maximum death time among all terminal pairs in S. Clearly, there
are at most log(∆S) + 1 classes.
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Since ξ is cross-monotonic, we have for every (si, ti), i ∈ [l], ξi(Si) ≤
ξi(S
r(i)
i ). Thus,
l∑
i=1
ξi(Si) ≤
l∑
i=1
ξi(S
r(i)
i ) =
log(∆S)+1∑
r=0
∑
(si,ti)∈Sr
ξi(S
r
i ). (49)
We first consider all terminal pairs of classes 0, 1, . . . , log(∆S/k) + 1. Note
that every such terminal pair has death time at most 2∆S/k. The cost share
of a terminal pair is at most twice its death time and thus
log(∆S/k)+1∑
r=0
∑
(si,ti)∈Sr
ξi(S
r
i ) ≤ k ·
4∆S
k
≤ 4∆S ≤ 2C(S). (50)
That is, all terminal pairs of class at most log(∆S/k) + 1 contribute at most
2C(S) to the left-hand side of (48). We can therefore concentrate on terminal
pairs in classes log(∆S/k) + 2, . . . , log(∆S) + 1. Note that these are at most
log k different classes. For each class r > log(∆S/k) + 1, we prove∑
(si,ti)∈Sr
ξi(S
r
i ) = O(log
2(|Sr|) · C(S)) = O(log2 k) · C(S).
This together with (49) and (50) proves (48). The next lemma states that for
each class, we can assume that all death times are rounded up to the nearest
power of 2.
Lemma 21 (Rounding Lemma) Fix some r and suppose we set all death
times of terminal pairs in Sr to 2r. Let ξ˜ be the cost shares computed by SF
with these modified death times. Then∑
(si,ti)∈Sr
ξi(S
r
i ) ≤ 3
∑
(si,ti)∈Sr
ξ˜i(S
r
i )
The proof of Lemma 21 is deferred to the end of this section.
7.1 Summability of SF with Identical Death Times
We next show that the cost shares of SF are O(log2 k)-summable if all death
times are equal. Eventually, we apply the result presented in this section to-
gether with the Rounding Lemma to each class r > log(∆S/k) + 1 separately.
For notational convenience, we use S instead of Sr here.
Suppose that the death time of all terminal pairs in S is ν, i.e., d(si, ti) = ν
for all i ∈ [l]; as before, we define l = |S|. Let F ∗ be a minimum cost Steiner
forest for terminal pair set S. For a tree T ∈ F ∗, let S(T ) be the set of terminal
pairs in S that are spanned by T . Consider a terminal pair (si, ti), 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
of S and let T ∈ F ∗ be the tree that contains si, ti, i.e., (si, ti) ∈ S(T ). Define
Si(T ) as the set of terminal pairs in S that precede (si, ti) (with respect to σ)
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and are also part of T ; more precisely Si(T ) = Si ∩ S(T ). Run SF on Si(T )
and let ξi(Si(T )) be the respective cost share of (si, ti). As Si(T ) ⊆ Si and
the cost shares computed by SF are cross-monotonic, we have
ξi(Si(T )) ≥ ξi(Si). (51)
We prove that for each tree T ∈ F ∗, we have∑
(si,ti)∈S(T )
ξi(Si(T )) = O(log
2(|S(T )|) · c(T )). (52)
Summing over all trees T ∈ F ∗ together with (51) then shows that
l∑
i=1
ξi(Si) = O(log
2 k) · C(S).
Given tree T , we construct a rooted tree T ′ = (V ′, E′), also called Shapley
tree in the following, and a non-negative length function ` : E′ → R+ on the
edges of T ′. We use T ′(e) to refer to the subtree of T ′ below edge e ∈ E′.
Moreover, for a node u ∈ V ′ let Pur be the unique u, r-path from u to the root
r of T ′. We construct T ′ such that the following four Shapley tree properties
hold:
(ST1) The leaves of T ′ are the terminals in S(T ).
(ST2) For every two terminals that are contained in the subtree T ′(e) for
some e ∈ E′, their distance in G is at most `(e), i.e., dG(u, v) ≤ `(e) for all
u, v ∈ S(T ) ∩ T ′(e).
(ST3) For every path Pur = (e1, . . . , em) from terminal u ∈ S(T ) to the root
r of T ′, we have
1. `(e1) = 1,
2. `(ej) = 2`(ej−1) for all 1 < j ≤ m, and
3. `(em) ≥ ν.
(ST4) The total length of T ′ is at most O(log |S(T )|) times the total cost of
T , i.e., `(T ′) = O(log(|S(T )|) · c(T )).
We use tree T ′ to define Shapley cost shares for all terminals in S(T ):
Let T ′[Si(T )] be the induced subtree of T ′ on terminals pair set Si(T ). For a
terminal pair (si, ti) ∈ S(T ), we define ξ′i(Si(T )) to be the sum of the respective
Shapley cost shares of terminals si and ti in T
′[Si(T )].
Lemma 22 Let T ′ be the Shapley tree of T and let ξ′ be the respective Shapley
cost shares. Then ∑
(si,ti)∈S(T )
ξ′i(Si(T )) ≤ H|S(T )| · `(T ′).
Proof As T ′[S1(T )] ⊆ T ′[S2(T )] ⊆ · · · ⊆ T ′[Sl(T )], the cost share contribution
of an edge e ∈ E′ to the left-hand side of the inequality is at most H|S(T )| ·`(e).
Summing over all edges e ∈ E′ of tree T ′ proves the lemma. uunionsq
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We next show that the cost share ξi(Si(T )) of terminal pair (si, ti) is upper
bounded by its corresponding Shapley cost share ξ′i(Si(T )) in T
′[Si(T )]. This
together with Lemma 22 and Property (ST4) establishes (52).
Lemma 23 The cost share ξi(Si(T )) of terminal pair (si, ti) ∈ S(T ) is at
most its Shapley cost share ξ′i(Si(T )).
Proof All terminals in S(T ) are active until time ν. The cost share ξu(Si(T ))
of a terminal u ∈ {si, ti} in SF is then defined as
ξu(Si(T )) =
∫ ν
τ=0
dτ
aτi (u)
where aτi (u) is the number of active terminals in u’s moat at time τ in the run
of SF(Si(T )). We bound the cost share that u = si receives in SF(Si(T )) by
its Shapley cost share. An analogous argument holds for u = ti.
Consider the induced subtree T ′i = T
′[Si(T )] on Si(T ). Let Pur =
(e1, . . . , em) be the unique u, r-path in T
′
i . Consider an edge ej , 1 < j ≤ m
and let T ′i (ej) be the subtree of T
′
i below edge ej . We use zi(ej) to refer to the
number of terminals in T ′i (ej); define zi(e1) = 1. The Shapley cost share that
u received for edge ej is `(ej)/zi(ej). Thus,
ξ′u(Si(T )) =
m∑
j=1
`(ej)
zi(ej)
.
Let x be any terminal in T ′i (ej). By Property (ST2) dG(u, x) ≤ `(ej). Since
both x and u are active until time ν, their respective moats in SF(Si(T )) must
have met by time at most dG(u, x)/2 ≤ `(ej)/2 = `(ej−1). Thus, aτi (u) ≥ zi(ej)
for all τ ≥ `(ej−1) for all 1 < j ≤ m.
Note that the cost share that u receives up to time 1 is at most 1. As
`(e1) = 1 and `(em) ≥ ν, we can write
ξu(Si(T )) =
∫ ν
τ=0
dτ
aτi (u)
≤ 1 +
m∑
j=2
∫ `(ej)
τ=`(ej−1)
dτ
aτi (u)
≤ 1 +
m∑
j=2
∫ `(ej)
τ=`(ej−1)
dτ
zi(ej)
= 1 +
m∑
j=2
`(ej−1)
zi(ej)
≤ ξ′u(Si(T )).
uunionsq
7.2 Tree Construction
There are several ways to obtain a tree T ′ that satisfies Properties (ST1)–
(ST4). For example, the HSTs construction given by Fakcharoenphol et al.
[13] satisfies all Properties (ST1)–(ST3) and Property (ST4) on expectation.
Alternatively, using ideas similar to the one presented in [38], we may insert
terminals one-by-one and obtain a tree T ′ whose nodes are terminals in S(T )
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and that satisfies Properties (ST2), (ST3(b)), (ST3(c)) and (ST4). In order to
achieve Property (ST1) and (ST3(a)), we simply replace each non-leaf terminal
u with parent edge e in T ′ by a path (e1, . . . , em) with `(em) = `(e)/2 and
`(e1) = 1. Clearly, this construction will add an additional cost of at most
`(T ′).
7.3 Rounding Lemma
Consider the set S = Sr of class r terminals and let l = |S|. As before we
assume that S is ordered according to σ and Si refers to the set of the first i
terminal pairs of S. For a terminal u ∈ {si, ti}, we also use Su to refer to the
corresponding set of terminal pairs Si. Define µ = 2
r−1, i.e., d(si, ti) ∈ (µ, 2µ]
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
Recall that in SF a terminal u ∈ {si, ti} is called active at time τ if τ ≤
d(si, ti); it is said to be inactive otherwise. A terminal receives cost share only
if it is active. For a terminal u that is active at time τ in SF(S), define aτu(S)
as the number of active terminals in u’s moat. The cost share that an active
terminal u receives at time τ is defined as ξτu(S) = 1/a
τ
u(S). The cost share
ξτsiti(S) of terminal pair (si, ti) at time τ is defined as ξ
τ
si(S) + ξ
τ
ti(S).
Fix a point of time τ ∈ (µ, 2µ]. Without loss of generality, let ξτsi(Si) ≥
ξτti(Si) for every terminal pair (si, ti), 1 ≤ i ≤ l. We say si is the dominating
terminal of (si, ti). Note that ξ
τ
siti(Si) ≤ 2ξτsi(Si). Let Dτ be the set of all
dominating terminals that are active at time τ . The following technical lemma
is the key to proving Lemma 21. It shows that for every terminal si ∈ Dτ the
cost share ξτsi(Si) that si receives at time τ can be charged to the cost share
that some terminal fτ (si) in Si received at time τ−µ. Moreover, the mapping
fτ is injective. This will enable us to charge the total cost share collected by
terminals in Dτ at time τ in SF(Si) to the total cost share of terminals in Si
at time τ − µ.
Lemma 24 Let Dτ be the set of all dominating terminals that are active at
time τ ∈ (µ, 2µ]. There exists a mapping fτ : Dτ → S such that the following
conditions hold:
1. For each si ∈ Dτ we have ξτsi(Si) ≤ ξτ−µfτ (si)(Sfτ (si)).
2. For all si, sj ∈ Dτ , i 6= j, we have fτ (si) 6= fτ (sj).
Proof We use Mτu (S) to refer to the moat of u at time τ in the run of SF on
terminal set S ⊆ R. Subsequently, we exploit the following two properties of
SF which can easily be proven given the results in Section 6.
Fact 13 Let S ⊆ R and consider a terminal u ∈ S. For every τ ′ ≤ τ we have
Mτ
′
u (S) ⊆Mτu (S).
Fact 14 Let S′ ⊆ S ⊆ R and consider a terminal u ∈ S′. For every τ we have
Mτu (S
′) ⊆Mτu (S).
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We assume that the set of dominating terminals Dτ is ordered according
to σ. We define fτ inductively. Suppose fτ satisfies Conditions 1 and 2 of the
lemma for the first n − 1 terminals in Dτ . (Let fτ be the empty mapping
for n = 0.) We define fτ (si) of the n-th terminal si of D
τ while maintaining
Conditions 1 and 2.
Assume ξτsi(Si) = 1/x. Let Csi = M
τ
si(Si) be the set of all terminals that
are contained in si’s moat at time τ . Note that |Csi | ≥ x. Order the set Csi
according to σ and delete all terminals except the first x ones. We call the
resulting terminal set Csi the candidate set of si. Note that Csi ⊆ Mτsi(Si).
We will eventually define f(si) = uˆ for some uˆ ∈ Csi .
Consider the m-th terminal u of Csi , 1 ≤ m ≤ x. Note that all terminals
in Mτ−µu (Su) are active at time τ − µ because all terminal death times are
larger than µ. By Facts 13 and 14 we have Mτ−µu (Su) ⊆Mτu (Su) ⊆Mτu (Si) =
Mτsi(Si). Therefore, the moat M
τ−µ
u (Su) contains at most m terminals. Since
m ≤ x, we have ξτ−µu (Su) ≥ 1/x for all u ∈ Csi .
Next we show that there always exists a choice of a terminal uˆ ∈ Csi such
that fτ (sj) 6= uˆ for all sj ∈ Dτ , j < i. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose
that for each terminal u ∈ Csi there exists a terminal sj ∈ Dτ , j < i, with
fτ (sj) = u. Note that by our induction hypothesis, f
τ (sj) 6= fτ (sk) for all j 6=
k and j, k < i. Consider some u ∈ Csi and let sj ∈ Dτ , j < i, with fτ (sj) = u.
By our construction of the candidate set, we have u = fτ (sj) ∈ Csj ⊆Mτsj (Sj).
Moreover, Mτsj (Sj) ⊆Mτsj (Si) by Fact 14. This implies that both Mτsj (Si) and
Mτsi(Si) contain u and therefore must be identical. As a consequence, sj is an
active terminal of Mτsi(Si) (recall that sj is active because sj ∈ Dτ ). Because
this holds for every u ∈ Csi , this leads to a contradiction to the assumption
that ξτsi(Si) = 1/x since we have identified |Csi | ≥ x active terminals in
Mτsi(Si) that are different from si. uunionsq
We can then proof Lemma 21:
Proof (Lemma 21) First observe that the executions of SF with and without
rounded death times are identical until time µ. Thus
l∑
i=1
∫ µ
τ=0
ξτsiti(Si)dτ =
l∑
i=1
∫ µ
τ=0
ξ˜τsiti(Si)dτ ≤
l∑
i=1
ξ˜siti(Si). (53)
For time τ ∈ (µ, 2µ] let fτ be a mapping as constructed in Lemma 24. Since
si is the dominating terminal of (si, ti), we have
l∑
i=1
ξτsiti(Si)dτ ≤ 2
l∑
i=1
ξτsi(Si)dτ ≤ 2
l∑
i=1
ξτ−µfτ (si)(Sfτ (si))dτ ≤ 2
l∑
i=1
ξτ−µsiti (Si)dτ,
where we used Condition 1 and 2 of Lemma 24 for the second and last in-
equality, respectively. Integrating over all time instants in (µ, 2µ], we obtain
l∑
i=1
∫ 2µ
τ=µ
ξτsiti(Si)dτ ≤ 2
l∑
i=1
∫ µ
τ=0
ξτsiti(Si)dτ
(53)
≤ 2
l∑
i=1
ξ˜siti(Si).
uunionsq
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8 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a general lifting technique to establish social cost
approximation guarantees for prize-collecting problems. We applied our tech-
nique to derive Moulin mechanisms for three optimization problems. Our
mechanisms are basically best possible both with respect to the budget bal-
ance and social cost approximation guarantee. It would be interesting to see
further examples where our technique can be used to derive optimal mecha-
nisms for prize-collecting problems. Moreover, it would be interesting to see
whether our lifting technique can be applied to cost-sharing methods which
are not defined through primal-dual algorithms.
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